BARBER MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

6/26/2014 9:51 PM

BULL IN THE CHINA MARKET: THE GAP
BETWEEN INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS AND
AUDITOR LIABILITY FOR CHINESE FINANCIAL
STATEMENT FRAUDS
PHILLIP BARBER*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 349
I. FRAUD AND CHINA ...................................................................................... 352
II. THE LONGTOP FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES FRAUD .......................... 357
A. The Longtop Fraud ............................................................................... 357
B. Taking Deloitte to Court ....................................................................... 360
C. Why Deloitte Escaped the Possibility of Liability................................ 363
III. AUDITORS’ LEGAL LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT
FRAUD ..................................................................................................... 364
A. Pleading Scienter .................................................................................. 365
B. Accounting Networks and Vicarious Liability ..................................... 368
IV. AUDITORS’ PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCIAL
STATEMENT FRAUD ............................................................................ 374
A. Is It Reasonable to Expect Auditors to Detect Financial Statement
Fraud? ............................................................................................... 376
B. The Expectations Gap........................................................................... 378
V. CANADIAN REGULATION: A SUCCESS STORY..................................... 385
A. The Development of Canadian Tort Law on Auditor Liability ............ 386
B. The Ontario Securities Act: Part XXIII.1 ............................................. 391
C. The Sino-Forest Fraud .......................................................................... 394
VI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES ...................................................... 397
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 401

INTRODUCTION
Two known fraudsters start a company in China and decide to glean
hundreds of millions of dollars from U.S. investors. So the fraudsters form
an entity structure that escapes both Chinese and U.S. regulation, they have
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local bank branches lie about deposit and loan balances, and they move
most of their expenses to an off-balance-sheet entity. With debts and
expenses concealed, they report industry-leading margins, so Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley underwrite their U.S. initial public offering
(IPO). They achieve a peak market capitalization of $2.4 billion dollars.
They hire a leading audit firm to attest that their fraudulent financial
statements fairly represent the company, but the audits are so obviously bad
that a cottage industry of short-sellers—researchers who look for obvious
frauds, buy short positions in them, and then expose the frauds on the
Internet—notices the implausibility of the fraudsters’ financial reports.
The stock price crashes, prompting the auditors to review matters a little
more closely. The auditors suddenly find fraud and publicly resign,
renouncing their prior audits. Unsurprisingly, investors sue the auditors in
addition to the company. Yet the suit cannot survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.
This was the case of In re Longtop Financial Technologies Ltd.
Securities Litigation (Longtop).1 It is one example in a long series of
audacious Chinese securities frauds. This Note examines circumstances
that have left U.S. capital markets especially vulnerable to frauds by U.S.listed Chinese firms. As described in Part I, the Chinese market places less
emphasis on the quality of financial reporting than the U.S. market and
accordingly has less rigorous enforcement of reporting requirements.
Efforts at cross-border regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have failed to provide effective protection for investors
in Chinese firms listed on U.S. exchanges. Where local and SEC
enforcement efforts cannot protect investors, the only remaining protection
for investors is the work of the independent auditor. U.S. investors in the
Chinese market rely on audits performed by U.S.-branded audit firms.
Part II analyzes the dismissal of claims against Deloitte in the Longtop
scandal, even though the plaintiffs possessed nearly perfect facts for a fraud
action. Part III discusses the two major legal obstacles that frustrated the
plaintiffs’ attempt to state a claim against Deloitte. The first was that the
elevated scienter pleading requirement of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)2 is an especially difficult hurdle for a
securities fraud action against a foreign auditor of a foreign company.
Direct evidence of scienter is unlikely to be available when both the auditor
and the audited company are in China. The second legal obstacle was that

1. 910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
2. The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a “strong
inference” of scienter. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012).
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the auditors’ global network structure successfully isolates liabilities into
individual member firms. Though the plaintiffs requested voluntary
dismissal of their claims against Deloitte’s international umbrella entity,
existing law would have likely insulated it from any liability even if the
claim had proceeded.
The Longtop example is another chapter of an old story. One hundred
years ago, auditors certified the correctness of financial statements, but
“certification” changed to “opinion” when they were exposed to potential
liability to third parties relying on those statements. Nonetheless, after the
Crash of 1929, certified public accountants (CPAs) were able to obtain an
exclusive franchise over auditing in place of a proposed public agency
takeover. Ever since, a long series of accounting scandals, from McKesson
& Robbins to Enron, has slowly increased auditors’ acceptance of a
professional responsibility to detect fraud. Each scandal demonstrated
inadequacy in the auditing function and in its regulation. Part IV places
financial statement frauds based in China in this historical context.
Canadian capital markets too have been victimized by China-based
securities frauds. Responding to both American post-Enron reform efforts
and Supreme Court of Canada decisions restricting common law auditor
liability, Ontario adopted a relatively successful statutory civil liability
scheme. Part V examines the development of auditor liability in Canada.
The effectiveness of the Canadian approach of exposing auditors to private
liability is compared to that of the U.S. approach of cross-border
regulation. In the case of Sino-Forest, Canadian investors received a record
settlement, while in the case of Longtop, U.S. investors received nothing
from the auditor.
Like prior scandals, China-based frauds should prompt reforms of the
U.S. auditing profession to better protect the U.S. investor. Part VI
suggests four reforms that would mitigate the issues that thwarted the fraud
action brought by Longtop’s investors. First, the PSLRA’s heightened
scienter-pleading requirement should be reformed. The PSLRA was
intended to prevent domestic nuisance suits, not to shield foreign actors
defrauding U.S. investors. Second, the role of scienter in the substantive
standard of auditor liability to purchasers in the secondary market should
be reconsidered. Third, the U.S. affiliate of a global accounting network
should bear liability for co-affiliate’s audits of foreign companies listed on
U.S. exchanges. Auditors should not be able to extend their brands to
audits of foreign companies listing in the United States without bearing any
liability for the assurance reasonably given to investors by those brands.
Fourth, U.S. auditors should face an increased scope of liability when they
or their affiliates attest to the financial statements of U.S.-listed companies
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that are based in markets that do not fully cooperate with U.S. regulators.
I. FRAUD AND CHINA
The quality of financial reporting in the Chinese market is relatively
low, and financial statement fraud is pervasive. There is also a major
“regulatory hole” with respect to “variable interest entities” (VIEs), which
evade U.S. regulators by being in China and avoid Chinese regulators by
listing in the United States through a Cayman Islands-based entity.3 U.S.
investors in Chinese companies must therefore rely heavily on audits by
U.S.-branded auditors. This reliance is big business for the auditors: the
“Big Four” audit firms charged Chinese firms listed in the United States
over $153 million in audit fees in 2010.4
The main financing sources of China’s listed companies have been
controlling shareholders and banks.5 These entities possess and act on
private information and, in the case of banks, take security interests in
physical assets.6 Accordingly, the Chinese stock market has less rigorous
enforcement of financial reporting requirements than is typical of
developed countries.7 As a result, a high proportion of firms listed in
Chinese stock markets receive modified audit opinions: between 1992 and
2006, 11% of China-listed firms received modified opinions, compared to
only 2% of companies listed in other East Asian markets in the same
period.8 Auditors issue modified opinions when they believe the financial
statements do not fairly present a firm’s financial position.9 A modified
opinion suggests that the quality of the financial statements is “very
poor.”10 However, in light of the traditional sources of financing for
Chinese companies, receiving a modified opinion has had little effect on
financing or investment available to these firms.11 Thus the Chinese stock

3. See infra notes 22–29 and accompanying text.
4. Paul Gillis, Who Audits China?, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2011, 10:56 PM), http://www.
chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/who-audits-china.html. The Big Four are PwC, Deloitte, EY
(formerly Ernst & Young), and KPMG.
5. Zhiwei Lin et al., Do Modified Audit Opinions Have Economic Consequences? Empirical
Evidence Based on Financial Constraints, 4 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 135, 151 (2011).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 137.
8. Id. at 135. Modified audit opinions are those with explanatory paragraphs or opinions that are
qualified, disclaimed, or adverse.
9. Id. at 152.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 136; but see Robert Czernkowski et al., The Value of Audit Qualifications in China, 25
MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 404, 422 (2010) (finding a significant reduction in stock prices for
companies receiving modified audit opinions accompanied by explanatory notes).
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market places—or at least historically has placed—less emphasis on the
quality of financial reporting, so the credibility of its financial reporting is
lower—and audit opinions about that reporting are less valued—than it
would be in the U.S. market.12
It is likely that these conditions continue when Chinese firms enter the
U.S. market by listing on a U.S. stock exchange. The “bonding
hypothesis” posits that becoming subject to U.S. regulation and
enforcement, as well as to intermediaries such as debt raters, commits the
cross-listing firm to fuller disclosure and respect for minority investors.13
Yet this hypothesis is doubtful when applied to China: one recent study has
found that “there is no evidence that cross-listing firms are superior to
domestic Chinese firms in financial reporting quality.”14
Moreover, within China, fraud is pervasive.15 Recent financial
statement frauds by Chinese firms listing in the United States have been
particularly audacious.16 In the two year period from 2011 to 2013, for
example, Longtop Financial Technologies, China MediaExpress, China
Sky One Medical, China Energy Savings Technology, ShengdaTech, China
Values Technology, Sino-Forest Corporation (listed in Toronto), and China
Integrated Energy each lost over 95% of its respective market capitalization
following discovery of major financial statement frauds.17 In 2010, almost
half of all securities class actions filed against foreign issuers were brought
against China-based companies listed on U.S. exchanges.18 In the same
period, there were at least forty-five New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or
NASDAQ delistings of Chinese companies, with another twenty-four

12. This is not to say that audit opinions are not valued at all by Chinese capital markets. See Z.
Jun Lin et al., Market Implications of the Audit Quality and Auditor Switches: Evidence from China, 20
J. INT’L FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 35 (2009) (presenting evidence that the Chinese stock market responds
positively to firms that switch to a larger auditor).
13. John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1780–81 (2002).
14. Li Li Eng & Ying Chou Lin, Accounting Quality, Earnings Management and Cross-Listings:
Evidence from China, REV. PAC. BASIN FIN. MARKETS & POL’YS, June 2012, at 1, 18.
15. See Stanley Lubman, Fraud, Culture and the Law: Can China Change?, WALL ST. J. CHINA
REAL TIME (Aug. 24, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/08/24/fraud-cultureand-the-law-can-china-change/ (discussing, in the context of “a social and economic environment in
which legal rules are as often as not disregarded,” various recent frauds in China involving, among
other things, fake medicine, fake Apple stores, and even fake military bases and fake prisons disguising
the production of counterfeit cigarettes).
16. Floyd Norris, The Audacity of Chinese Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/05/27/business/27norris.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
17. YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com (get quotes search) (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
18. David Bario, Two (More) U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Are Hit with Securities Class
Actions, AM. LAW., Feb. 9, 2011, available at LEXIS ADVANCE.
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facing imminent delisting.19
Though fraud is pervasive in China, Chinese regulations can
nonetheless be onerous. For example, private Chinese companies need
state permission to list overseas, and this permission was, until recently,
difficult to acquire.20 In addition, foreign investment is restricted in certain
sectors, such as telecommunications and the Internet.21 Chinese firms
wishing to list in the United States can avoid these restrictions and escape
Chinese regulation of financial reporting through the use of a VIE
structure. In such a structure, a domestic entity, owned by a Chinese
national, owns the substantive business.22 Contractual agreements, rather
than equity, transfer most of the economic interest in that entity to another
Chinese entity that is a subsidiary owned by a foreign company, usually a
Cayman Islands corporation.23 The contractual agreements typically
include a loan agreement, by which the foreign company capitalizes the
domestic company; an equity pledge agreement that provides collateral
under the loan agreement; a call option agreement allowing the foreign
company to purchase the domestic company at any time; a power of
attorney agreement giving all of the domestic company’s shareholder rights

19. Chinese Delistings on U.S. Exchanges, TRADING CHINA (Sept. 30, 2012), http://china.fixyou.
co.uk/2012/09/chinese-delistings-on-us-exchanges.html.
20. See Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Gonggao [1999] 83 Hao: Zhong Guo
Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Qiye Shenqing Jingwai Shangshi Youguan Wenti De
Tongzhi (中国证券监督管理委员会公告 1999 83号：中国证券监督管理委员会关于企业申请境外
上市有关问题的通知) [China Securities Regulatory Commission Announcement [1999] No. 83:
Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Enterprise Applications for Overseas Listing] (promulgated by
the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n., July 14, 1999, effective July 14, 1999), available at http://www.csrc.
gov.cn/pub/newsite/xxfw/fgwj/bmgz/200803/t20080305_77921.htm. These rules have been abolished
and replaced by Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Gonggao [2012] 45 Hao: Guanyu
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Jingwai Faxing Gupiao He Shangshi Shenbao Wenjian Ji Shenhe Chengxu De
Jianguan Zhiying (中国证券监督管理委员会公告 2012 45号: 关于股份有限公司境外发行股票和上
市申报文件及审核程序的监管指引) [China Securities Regulatory Commission Announcement
[2012] No. 45: Guidelines for Supervising the Application Documents and Examination Procedures for
the Overseas Stock Issuance and Listing of Joint Stock Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec.
Reg. Comm’n., Dec. 20, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/
laws/overRule/Announcement/201301/t20130106_220125.
21. Waishang Touzi Dianxin Qiye Guanli Guiding (外商投资电信企业管理规定) [Provisions on
Administration of Foreign-Invested Telecommunications Enterprises] (promulgated by St. Council
Decree No. 333, Dec. 11, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002, as amended Sept. 10, 2008, by St. Council
Decree No. 534 (2008)), available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1102750.htm.
In the law, the term “valued added services” includes many Internet services. See Lothar Determann,
Internet Business Law in China for US Companies, BAKER & MCKENZIE, http://www.bakermckenzie.
com/RRGoverningEBusinessInChinaOct09/ (last visited May 7, 2014).
22. Paul Gillis, Accounting Matters: Variable Interest Entities in China, GUEST SERIES (Forensic
Asia Ltd., H.K., China), Sept. 18, 2012, at 4–5, available at http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie_
2012septaccountingmatte.pdf.
23. Id.
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to the foreign company; and a technical service agreement, through which
the foreign company extracts the profits of the domestic company.24
These agreements allow the domestic company to be consolidated into
the financial statements of the Cayman Islands holding corporation, which
lists on U.S. exchanges.25 In 2010, 47% of NYSE and 65% of NASDAQ
listings of Chinese firms used VIEs.26 Since foreign investment in the
Internet sector is restricted in China, eight of the largest ten VIE listings on
U.S. exchanges are Internet companies.27 By far the largest U.S.-listed
Chinese VIE is Baidu—China’s Google—with a market capitalization of
over $40 billion dollars.28 These Cayman Islands entities are considered
foreign corporations not subject to Chinese regulation.29 As U.S.-listed
entities, they are subject to U.S. financial reporting regulations, but because
the substantive business activities are in China, any audit must be
conducted there, requiring Chinese cooperation.
This cooperation is lacking for any Chinese firm listed in the United
States, including VIEs. China views U.S. regulatory oversight of Chinese
auditors as a violation of Chinese sovereignty.30 China also heavily
regulates the transfer of documents out of China. China’s “state secrets”
laws may cover audit work papers and may require pre-approval from
Chinese regulatory authorities before any disclosure to foreign regulators. 31

24. Id. at 5–6.
25. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION § 810-10 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
26. Paul Gillis, Statistics on VIE Usage, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011, 7:20 PM), http://
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/statistics-on-vie-usage.html.
27. Gillis, supra note 22, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Patrick Chovanec, The Clash of the Balance Sheets, FOREIGN POL’Y, Dec. 10, 2012, http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/10/China_accounting_scandal_SEC_Baidu.
31. Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guojia Baomi Ju Guojia Dang’an Ju
Zhengjian Hui GongGao (2009) 29 Hao: Guanyu Jiaqiang Zai Jingwai Faxing Zhengquan Yu Shangshi
Xiangguan Baomi he Dangan Guanli Gongzuo De Guiding (中国证券监督管理委员会 国家保密局
国家档案局—-证监会公告[2009] 29号：关于加强在境外发行证券与上市相关保密和档案管理工
作的规定) [China Securities Regulatory Commission announcement No. 29 (2009): Provisions on
Strengthening Confidentiality and Archives Administration in Overseas Issuance and Listing of
Securities] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Oct. 20, 2009, effective Oct. 20, 2009),
available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2010/content_1620613.htm (“[W]here overseas listed
companies provide or publicly disclose documents, materials, or other items related to state secrets to
the relevant securities companies, securities service institutions, and overseas regulatory authorities, the
said companies shall apply for the approval of competent departments with the authority of examination
and approval.”). Article 9 of the Law on Guarding State Secrets defines state secrets as “matters which,
if divulged, would harm national security and interests in the areas of politics, economics, national
defense, and diplomacy.” Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa (中华人民共和国
保守国家秘密法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Sept. 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989, amended by the
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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has a
statutory responsibility to inspect auditing of U.S.-listed companies that is
conducted abroad.32 The PCAOB has reached inspection agreements with
regulators in most major economies but not with China.33 The original
deadline to complete these international inspections was extended from
2008 to 2009 and again to December 31, 2012.34 The passing of the
extended deadline raised the prospect of PCAOB deregistration of Chinese
accounting firms, including the local affiliates of the Big Four. On
November 29, 2012, PCAOB Chairman James Doty stated,
[W]e have not been allowed to inspect any Chinese [auditing] firms that
are registered with us, notwithstanding the fact that those firms continue
to issue audit reports that are filed with the SEC and relied on by U.S.
investors.
....
At some point we must inspect [them] as part of our statutory
duty . . . . The firms, by the way, have gotten themselves into a pickle.35

On May 7, 2013, the PCAOB and Chinese regulators concluded an
agreement on enforcement cooperation.36 The agreement allows PCAOB
access to auditor work papers for specific investigations, but disclosure of
work papers to private litigants requires preapproval from Chinese
regulators.37 The agreement does not allow PCAOB inspections of
auditors. It also does not apply to the SEC, which at the time of the
agreement had pending administrative proceedings charging the Chinese
affiliates of each of the Big Four with violations of the Securities Exchange

Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Apr. 29, 2010, effective Oct. 1, 2010) 2010 STANDING COMM.
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 372. But see Declaration of Donald Clarke at 3, U.S. SEC v. Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., 928 F. Supp. 2d 43 (2013) (Misc. No. 11-512 GK/DAR) (expressing the
opinion that, for off-site inspections, Chinese law does not require pre-approval and that an auditor
could make a judgment for itself that its work papers contain no state secrets).
32. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002 §
106, 15 U.S.C. § 7216 (2012), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 §§ 929J, 982(g).
33. Stanley Lubman, Single-Agency Oversight Could Help U.S.-China Auditing, WALL ST. J.
CHINA REAL TIME (Dec. 28, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/12/28/singleagency-oversight-could-help-u-s-china-auditing/.
34. PCAOB RULE 4003(g) (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2011).
35. Michael Cohn, PCAOB Chair Doty Warns Against Accounting Shortcuts, ACCT. TODAY
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/PCAOB-Chair-James-Doty-Warns-AuditingShortcuts-64833-1.html.
36. Memorandum of Understanding on Enforcement Cooperation, U.S.-China, May 7, 2013,
available at http://pcaobus.org/International/Documents/MOU_China.pdf.
37. Id. art. VII.
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Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for their refusal to provide the SEC with
their audit work papers in relation to work performed for nine clients under
investigation for fraud.38 The proceedings could disqualify the firms from
auditing U.S.-listed companies.39
Chinese companies that list on U.S. exchanges operate in a high fraud
environment in which financial statements have low credibility. A great
many Chinese firms listing in the United States also escape Chinese
regulation through VIEs and escape U.S. regulation through China’s
reluctance to cooperate with U.S. regulators. Unsurprisingly, financial
statement frauds are a major problem. For investors in U.S.-listed Chinese
firms, a Big Four brand name may well be the only assurance against
financial statement fraud available.
II. THE LONGTOP FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES FRAUD
Investors relied on the assurance of a Big Four brand name when they
invested billions in Longtop. They lost everything, but the auditor escaped
any liability. Examination of the Longtop fraud and the dismissal of claims
against Longtop’s auditor highlights the legal obstacles that investors face
when they seek to hold auditors liable for failing to conduct a proper audit
of a U.S.-listed Chinese firm. Paradoxically, the law makes it more
difficult to hold auditors liable for poor quality audits in precisely the
circumstances in which audit quality is the only available assurance against
fraud.
A. The Longtop Fraud
Longtop is a Cayman Islands corporation with operations located in
Xiamen, China, offering technology services to Chinese banks.40 Through
a VIE structure, Longtop held its IPO on the NYSE on October 25, 2007,
and a secondary offering on November 23, 2009.41 Longtop’s external
auditor was Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd. (DTTC), Deloitte’s China
affiliate, which issued unqualified audit opinions on Longtop’s financial
statements and, in a prospectus filed with the SEC, consented to the use of
its audit reports to support Longtop’s security offerings.42
Citron Research is a short-selling firm that researches public company
38. BDO China Dahua CPA Co., Exchange Act Release No. 68,335, 105 SEC Docket 302 (Dec.
3, 2012) (instituting administrative proceedings). The SEC also charged the Chinese affiliate of BDO,
the fifth-largest global auditor. Id.
39. Id. at 5.
40. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
41. Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5) (Nov. 17, 2009).
42. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 567.
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financial disclosures, identifies companies with questionable financial
reporting, takes a short position in them, and then discloses its research to
the market.43 On April 26, 2011, Citron Research published a report on its
website stating, “It is the opinion of Citron that every financial statement
[of Longtop] from its IPO to this date is fraudulent.”44 Citron noted that
Longtop’s gross and operating margins, 62.5% and 49%, respectively,
greatly exceeded peer companies’ gross and operating margins, which were
15–50% and 10–25%, respectively.45 Longtop claimed that gross margins
on its software sales were 90% and that it had achieved these margins
through an outsourcing arrangement.46
Citron researched the outsourcing arrangement and discovered that the
margins had been achieved by transferring operating costs to an offbalance-sheet entity, which had been excluded from Longtop’s financial
statements but was clearly a related party. As of March 31, 2010, Longtop
had 4258 employees, 76% of whom were employed through a single
human resources staffing company: Xiamen Longtop Human Resources
Company (XLHRS).47 Longtop was XLHRS’s only customer.48 Despite
this, Longtop had no long-term contract with XLHRS, and XLHRS never
solicited any other clients.49 XLHRS had been formed five months before
Longtop’s IPO, was located in the same building as Longtop, and shared
Longtop’s email servers.50 Finally, when the relationship between Longtop
and XLHRS was challenged, Longtop terminated it and directly employed
the employees formerly employed through XLHRS.51
The Citron report also raised questions about Longtop’s leadership.
Chairman Xiaogong Jia and Chief Executive Officer Weizhou Lian had
previously been charged with fraud in Chinese proceedings.52 Chairman
Xiaogong Jia (also known as Ka Hiu Kung) claimed to have given 70% of
his stock holdings, valued at approximately $250 million dollars, as a gift
to employees and friends.53 Citron expressed the opinion that this
transaction in fact paid off Longtop’s hidden liabilities or had some ulterior
43. Id. at 568.
44. Citron Reports on Longtop Financial, CITRON RES. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.
citronresearch.com/citron-reports-on-longtop-financial-nyselft/.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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motive.54
Release of this report caused Longtop’s share price to decline by
26%.55 Longtop responded with an investor call two days after the report’s
release.56 During the call, Chief Financial Officer Derek Palaschuk denied
any wrongdoing.57 He pointed to DTTC’s unqualified audit opinions and
stated that those questioning Longtop’s financials “were ‘criticizing the
integrity of one of the top accounting firms in the world.’”58 He went on to
say, “[T]he most important relations I have [are] with my family, my
C.E.O., and then the next on the list is Deloitte as our auditor, because their
trust and support is [sic] extremely important.”59
Within a month of this conference call, DTTC resigned as Longtop’s
auditor, and the NYSE halted trading in Longtop’s American Depositary
Shares.60 DTTC’s resignation letter claimed that it had determined that
further bank balance confirmations were necessary and that these further
confirmations had revealed fictitious deposit balances and unreported loan
liabilities.61 On May 17, 2011, DTTC attempted to confirm balances
through bank headquarters instead of local branches.62 DTTC claimed that
Longtop had obstructed this process by telling the bank headquarters that
DTTC was not in fact its auditor and that it had detained DTTC audit
files.63
DTTC was well aware that financial statement frauds involving forged
bank statements and local bank branch collusion are common in China.
China MediaExpress, also audited by DTTC, also engaged in this type of
fraud.64 Other examples include China Century Dragon Media, Inc., China
Intelligent Lighting and Electronics, Inc., and NIVS Intellimedia
Technology Group, Inc.65 In the case of the China MediaExpress fraud,
when DTTC requested that confirmations be made by the bank

54. Id.
55. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Norris, supra note 16.
59. Id.
60. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
61. Id. at 568–69; see also Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶ 48, id. (No. 11-cv-3658-SAS)
(noting that another short-seller, Bronte Capital, questioned the secondary offering when the company
had already had enough cash on hand to fund operations for 26 quarters).
62. Norris, supra note 16.
63. Id.
64. Paul Gillis, Auditing Cash in China, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2011, 8:49 PM),
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/auditing-cash-in-china.html.
65. Id.
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headquarters and not the local branch, China MediaExpress refused, and
DTTC resigned.66 Likewise, in the case of the Longtop fraud, DTTC
resigned as Longtop’s auditor and declared Longtop’s previous financial
statements to be no longer reliable.67
B. Taking Deloitte to Court
Unsurprisingly, a securities class action was filed against Longtop,
DTTC, and DTTC’s umbrella entity, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd.
(DTT).68 The complaint alleged that DTTC had violated SEC Rule 10b-5
and that DTT had violated Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.69 SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibits acts or omissions resulting in fraud or
deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.70 Section
20(a) provides liability for persons who control persons who violate any
provision of the Securities Exchange Act or any rule thereunder.71 The
complaint alleged that DTTC had recklessly failed to investigate Longtop’s
bank and loan balances adequately and had recklessly failed to detect the
transfer of costs to the unreported related entity XLHRS.72
DTTC moved to dismiss for failure to plead a strong inference of
scienter as required by the PSLRA.73 The PSLRA imposes on plaintiffs
both a heightened pleading standard and a stay on discovery pending
resolution of a defendant’s motion to dismiss.74 Under the heightened
standard, plaintiffs must allege “with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”75
The Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder—nearly twenty
years before the PSLRA—that scienter is the required state of mind for
liability under Rule 10b-5.76 Since that case, courts have consistently held

66. Id. That fraud was also exposed by Citron Research. Jason Raznick, Is China MediaExpress
a Fraud? Part 1, FORBES, Feb. 7, 2011, 11:16 AM, http://www.forbes.com/sites/benzingainsights/2011/
02/07/is-china-mediaexpress-a-fraud-part-1/.
67. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
68. See infra Part III.B (discussing DTT’s function in the context of the Parmalat case).
69. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 566–67. Claims under Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933 were not brought, presumably because the statute of limitations had
run. See infra notes 364–69 and accompanying text.
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2012).
72. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
73. Id. at 571–72.
74. § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
75. § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
76. 425 U.S. 185, 212–15 (1976).
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that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.77 So, under the
PSLRA, plaintiffs bringing Rule 10b-5 suits against auditors must plead
particular facts creating a “strong inference” of auditor recklessness while
discovery is stayed.
The court quickly disposed of plaintiffs’ allegations that DTTC had
failed to conform to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) when
conducting its audit and that its failure had been so egregious as to amount
to recklessness.78 The plaintiffs characterized Citron’s points about
XLHRS as six “red flags” and alleged that even a “perfunctory review”
would have revealed (1) that XLHRS had been formed shortly before
Longtop’s IPO, (2) that XLHRS had not been mentioned in Longtop’s
filings until 2009, (3) that XLHRS had occupied the same building with
Longtop, (4) that XLHRS had shared the “Longtop” name, (5) that XLHRS
had had no customers other than Longtop, and (6) that XLHRS had shared
Longtop’s email server.79 They alleged that these “red flags” had been so
obvious that DTTC must have been aware of them and had thus been
reckless when it failed to address them in its audits.80
The court rejected this allegation with surprising reasoning. It found
only three of those “red flags” to be so obvious that Deloitte must have
noticed them: 1) XLHRS’s formation shortly before Longtop’s IPO, 2) an
allegation that XLHRS had not been mentioned in Longtop’s financials
before 2009, and 3) the fact that XLHRS shared the name “Longtop.”81
One “red flag” excluded from this list is the fact that XLHRS shared the
same building in Xiamen as Longtop. It is impossible to understand how
this would not have been obvious to an onsite auditor.
Considering the three “red flags” it conceded as obvious, the court
stated, “The fact that XLHRS was formed shortly before Longtop’s IPO,
and that it had ‘Longtop’ in its name, would not lead a reasonable auditor
to suspect wrongdoing, given that this sort of staffing arrangement is
common.”82 The court provided no argument or authority to support this
statement, which lacks support because it is manifestly false: it is not at all
common for a company to obtain three-quarters of its employees from an

77. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) (“Every
Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter
requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly . . . .”).
78. See infra Part III.A (explaining that alleged nonconformity with professional standards fails to
meet the scienter pleading requirement for Rule 10b-5 actions).
79. Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, ¶¶ 135–36.
80. Id. ¶¶ 136–37.
81. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
82. Id. at 576.
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unrelated entity that shares the company’s name and building and that was
formed immediately prior to the company’s IPO. It is precisely because
this is uncommon that Citron’s research discovered that XLHRS was not an
unrelated entity but instead a vehicle for concealing expenses. The court’s
offhand dismissal of the “red flags” as “red herrings”83 is difficult to
reconcile with the fact that those “red herrings” led Citron, a securities
research firm, to invest its own money in short positions in the belief that
they demonstrated Longtop to be a fraud.
The court refused to consider the short-seller reports as evidence
supporting an inference of recklessness by Deloitte.84 While they are
certainly not dispositive on that question, the fact that the fraud was so
obvious that a short-seller who had never been to China detected it even
though professional, onsite audits over several years by a Chinese auditor
operating under policies set by Deloitte failed to do so is surely
circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of recklessness by DTTC.
The Longtop plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, with additional
information obtained through discovery in proceedings against Mr.
Palaschuk, but this was dismissed on April 8, 2013, for “the same defects
laboriously identified in the Dismissal Opinion” and without leave for
further amendment.85 The court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to state
a claim despite “access to copious discovery in crafting the Amended
Complaint,” despite the fact that the plaintiffs, like the SEC, had had no
access to Deloitte’s working papers.86
Section 20(a) claims against DTT were voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice a few months before the dismissal of claims against DTTC.87
Regardless, they necessarily would have been dismissed as well because
the secondary liability claims against DTT under Section 20(a) were based
on DTTC’s alleged primary violation.88 An SEC investigation against
83. Id. at 577.
84. Id. at 577–78.
85. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., 939 F. Supp. 2d 360, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
86. Id. Several months after the dismissal of claims against DTTC in Longtop, the SEC received
“a substantial volume of documents . . . including the DTTC audit workpapers and certain other
documents related to Longtop.” SEC, Joined by Deloitte China, Files a Motion to Dismiss Without
Prejudice the Subpoena Enforcement Action, Litigation Release No. 22,911, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 3531 (Jan. 27, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
2014/lr22911.htm. This occurred less than a week after an SEC administrative law judge suspended the
affiliates of each of the Big Four firms. BDO China Dahua CPA Co. Ltd., Initial Decision Release No.
553 (ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2014/id553ce.pdf.
87. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice of Defendants Thomas Gurnee and Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu Limited at 1, In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., No. 11-cv-3658-SAS (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2012).
88. A primary violator is a required by Section 20(a). 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
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DTTC for its conduct in the Longtop case is ongoing as of January 2014.89
C. Why Deloitte Escaped the Possibility of Liability
The court concluded its opinion by finding that the facts alleged led to
a “compelling and stronger inference that DTTC [had] performed a diligent
audit, only to be duped by Longtop’s fraud.”90 The plaintiffs lost under the
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard for scienter. The court found it
more compelling to assume Deloitte to be a victim of the fraud. In light of
the facts of the case, this result seems stunning, and it is worth examining
the factors that led to it.
The plaintiffs argued that DTTC was reckless in not identifying
XLHRS as a related-party by 1) giving lengthy quotations from, and
paraphrases of, auditing standards,91 2) repeating “red flags” identified by
short-selling equities researchers, and 3) concluding that even a
“perfunctory review” by DTTC would have exposed those flags.”92
DTTC’s review, therefore, had been less-than-perfunctory. Since a lessthan-perfunctory review is clearly inconsistent with auditing standards, the
plaintiffs concluded that DTTC must have known that it was obligated to
do more “to identify and conduct procedures aimed at uncovering relatedparty transactions”93 and that DTTC had nonetheless recklessly failed “to
undertake any meaningful investigation.”94
This argument was inadequate.
Nonconformity with auditing
standards will not establish an inference of scienter.95 Undoubtedly,
plaintiff’s counsel was hindered by the inability under the PSLRA to
conduct discovery before pleading particular facts. But crucial details that
would have explained why those “red flags” gave rise to a “strong
inference” of scienter were omitted: for example, the definition of a related
party or the fact that audits are onsite inspections (so that Deloitte must
have known that XLHRS had shared a building with Longtop). Most
importantly, instead of merely quoting professional standards, the plaintiffs
could have also described the procedure by which an auditor performs a
89. See Litigation Release No. 22,911, supra note 86 (noting the delivery of documents “in
connection with the SEC’s investigation into possible fraud by DTTC’s former audit client, Chinabased Longtop Financial Technologies Limited”).
90. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
91. Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, ¶¶ 123–34; see also In re Longtop Fin.
Techs. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 575–76, 581 (referring to “the Complaint’s laundry list of auditing
standards” and “general recitations of accounting standards”).
92. Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, ¶¶ 135–36.
93. Id. ¶ 136.
94. Id. ¶ 137.
95. See infra Part III.A.
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review, pointing out the many ways in which a standard review procedure
necessarily would have identified XLHRS as a related party and supporting
an inference that DTTC had chosen not to review Longtop’s accounts as
required and therefore had acted with scienter.96
In addition, China’s high-fraud reputation may have affected the
court: operating in a perceived accounting battlefield might increase
sympathy for auditors in fraud actions.97 This sympathy could well be
toxic when combined with the heightened scienter-pleading requirement’s
effect of forcing the court to speculate apologies for the defendant’s
behavior.
Furthermore, although the PSLRA does not distinguish between
auditors and other defendants regarding scienter, courts often do.98 They
often assume auditors to be highly rational actors with no economic
incentive to perform fraudulent audits.99 A judicial presumption that
auditors simply are not reckless is indeed a difficult hurdle for any plaintiff
to overcome. This presumption may result from courts’ failure to properly
consider important features of the auditing industry, such as its
oligopolistic nature and the revolving door connecting auditors with their
clients.100 The audit profession’s seventy years of closing the “expectations
gap” by lowering expectations that auditors should find fraud has been at
least as important in creating the presumption against auditor
recklessness.101 A failure to discover fraud is not likely to create a “strong
inference” of scienter when the expectation that fraud should have been
discovered is low.
III. AUDITORS’ LEGAL LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT
FRAUD
When auditors issue unqualified opinions to investors concerning a
public company’s fraudulent financial statements, they potentially face
liability to persons using those statements. Investors may bring an action
under SEC Rule 10b-5. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 confers on federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over class action

96. For examples of procedures used to identify related parties and transactions with related
parties, see RELATED PARTIES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122, §§ 550 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 2012).
97. See supra Part I (describing pervasive fraud in China).
98. Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN.
L. REV. 1097, 1210.
99. Id. at 1174–76.
100. Id. at 1180–1202.
101. See infra Part IV.B.
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suits involving listed securities and seeking damages on behalf of more
than fifty people.102 Auditors can also be subject to liability in a derivative
shareholder action for a breach of their duty to the client corporation.
Though a derivative action on behalf of a Chinese corporation103 or liability
to a bankruptcy trustee is possible in the aftermath of fraud orchestrated by
senior management and enabled by auditor collusion or negligence,104 these
are beyond the scope of this Note. But within that scope are the two
auditor-liability issues that thwarted Longtop’s investors’ claims. The first
issue is the relation of the PSLRA’s heightened scienter pleading
requirement to auditor liability. The second is the legal structure of the
auditing profession, which isolates liability to a single network affiliate.
Ironically, the success of this structure in containing liability can be seen in
In re Parmalat Securities Litigation,105 a case in which a global auditing
network was exposed to liability for the actions of a network affiliate.
A. Pleading Scienter
Rule 10b-5 actions have required an allegation of scienter since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.106 Scienter is
intent by the defendant to defraud.107 The Court did not decide whether
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement, but subsequent decisions
have held uniformly that it does.108 What generally constitutes recklessness
under Rule 10b-5 may not be clear,109 but for auditors, a standard rooted in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche110 has emerged as a consensus in the circuits.
Chief Judge Cardozo held in Ultramares that, although third parties

102. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
103. See Batchelder v. Kawamoto, 147 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that an American
Depositary Receipt holder lacks standing to bring a shareholder derivative action on behalf of an
overseas corporation when governing foreign law limits standing to shareholders of record); infra Part I
(describing the variable interest entity structure commonly used, in lieu of direct listing, by Chinese
firms listed in the United States).
104. For a recent and comprehensive treatment of such liability, see Christine M. Shepard, Note,
Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 275 (2012).
105. 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
106. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
107. Id. at 193 n.12. The Court left open the possibility that recklessness can satisfy the scienter
requirement. Id.
108. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) (“Every Court of
Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by
showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly . . . .”).
109. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 883 (10th ed. 2011).
110. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1932).
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relying on an audit report could not bring tort actions against the auditors
for negligence,111 the auditors could, if they “acted without information
leading to a sincere or genuine belief” and “closed their eyes to the
obvious,” be liable to those third parties for fraudulent misrepresentation.112
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
drew on Ultramares to define accounting recklessness as “[a] refusal to see
the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently gross.”113
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also adopted the
Ultramares line for reckless scienter in auditor liability cases postHochfelder: “It seems to us that the purpose of footnote 12 of the
Hochfelder opinion was to preserve, at least in the context of accountants’
liability, the standards of scienter developed in Ultramares . . . .”114 For
purposes of auditor liability, the Ultramares standard of scienter also
satisfies the Franke standard of recklessness adopted in Sundstrand.115 In
SEC v. Price Waterhouse,116 the Southern District of New York drew on
McLean, Sundstrand, and other cases to hold that that an auditor is reckless
only when
the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no
audit at all, or “an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate
the doubtful,” or that the accounting judgments which were made were
such that no reasonable accountant would have made the same decisions
if confronted with the same facts.117

111. Id. at 447.
112. Id. at 449.
113. Jordan v. Madison Leasing Co., 596 F. Supp. 707, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting State St.
Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419). State Street Trust Co. cited Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 449, as
the source of this definition. For another case adopting this standard in the Southern District of New
York, see Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 762 F. Supp. 599, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(quoting Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., 706 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1989))
(“[A]n egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, may in some cases give rise
to an inference of gross negligence which can be the functional equivalent of recklessness.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
114. McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979).
115. Id. Under the Franke standard, “reckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable
omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence, but an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.” Franke v.
Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 n.5 (1976); Beecher v. Able, Nos. 66 Civ. 3471, 66 Civ. 3382, 66 Civ.
3775, 1975 WL 420 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1975); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 185–86 (4th ed. 1971)). The Seventh Circuit adopted the Franke standard in Sundstrand Corp.
v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
116. 797 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
117. Id. at 1240 (citations omitted).
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The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have adopted this standard, which now appears to be the consensus
standard for auditor recklessness.118
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts giving
rise to a “strong inference” of scienter.119 This means facts that constitute
direct evidence of scienter, circumstantial evidence of scienter, or the
defendant’s motive and opportunity to commit fraud.120 In an action
against an auditor of a foreign company, however, direct evidence of
scienter is unlikely to be available, especially when both the auditor and the
audited company are in China.121 Nor is motive and opportunity likely to
evidence scienter, since auditors generally do not buy or sell shares in the
companies they audit.122 So actions against auditors generally must plead
detailed facts showing circumstantial evidence of scienter. Recognizing
this, the Third Circuit in McLean v. Alexander noted that
[c]ircumstantial evidence may often be the principal, if not the only,
means of proving bad faith. A showing of shoddy accounting practices
amounting at best to a “pretended audit,” or of grounds supporting a
representation “so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no
genuine belief back of it” have traditionally supported a finding of
liability in the face of repeated assertions of good faith, and continue to
do so. In such cases, the factfinder may justifiably conclude that despite
those assertions the “danger of misleading . . . (was) so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it.”123

After the enactment of the PSLRA, the Supreme Court held in Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. that the Act’s heightened standard
requires a court considering a motion to dismiss a complaint to first
determine “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a

118. See Dronsejko v. Grant Thornton, 632 F.3d 658, 665 (10th Cir. 2011); PR Diamonds, Inc. v.
Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407,
1426 (9th Cir. 1994).
119. § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012).
120. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 109, at 884.
121. The PSLRA bars pre-trial discovery until after resolution of a motion to dismiss. § 101(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
122. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ET § 101.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
2013) (declaring that the independence of a CPA is considered impaired if he or she had any direct
material financial interest in the client).
123. 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977); O’Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1937); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (N.Y. 1931)).
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strong inference of scienter.”124 If they do, the court must then engage in a
“comparative inquiry” to determine “if a reasonable person would deem the
inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing
inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”125 Thus, courts must now
engage in the “comparative inquiry” well before any trial. A showing of
“shoddy accounting practices” no longer suffices even to get to discovery if
opposing inferences can be proffered that, for some reason, appear more
“compelling” to the judge deciding a motion to dismiss.
Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs must meet this fuzzy standard before
proceeding to any pre-trial discovery. This limitation obviously reduces
the likelihood of succeeding in an action against an auditor. Yet it is
equally important that the recklessness standard adopted by the circuits
does not hinge on professional standards. Hence, alleging failure to
conform to professional standards will be insufficient to show scienter.
Through Hochfelder’s footnote 12, the circuits have adopted Chief Judge
Cardozo’s standard from Ultramares, rather than the professional standards
evolved in response to that standard.
B. Accounting Networks and Vicarious Liability
The largest auditors in the United States, the Big Four, are limited
liability partnerships (LLPs) and members of global accounting networks.
The LLP became available for U.S. auditors in the early 1990s in response
to Texas lawsuits against lawyers and auditors, and now all large auditors
are LLPs.126 In an LLP, no partner has personal liability for malpractice
claims against any other partner.127 Internationally, audit firms organize as
professional services networks of separate national firms.128 Accounting
firms achieved quick, global growth by using a model similar to
franchising.129 To expand into new national markets, firms contract with
local firms.130 The local firm receives a license to the international firm’s
trademark and other intellectual property and agrees to contribute money

124. 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
125. Id. at 324.
126. See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth
(Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069–71 (1995) (describing the emergence of LLP legislation in
response to suits against law firms and accounting firms after savings and loan failures in Texas).
127. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997).
128. Occasionally, firms do span borders. For example, KPMG has merged many of its European
and Middle Eastern member firms into KPMG Europe LLP. See About, KPMG EUROPE LLP,
http://www.kpmg.com/eu/en/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).
129. Daniel Allen & Mindy Haverson, Note, An Alternative Approach to Vicarious Liability for
International Accounting Firm Networks, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 426, 429–30 (2010).
130. Id.
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and support to the network and to maintain the standards of quality
specified by network policies.131 A separate international umbrella entity
sets strategy, develops and implements policies, and promulgates brand and
quality standards.132 The umbrella entities of global accounting networks
must exercise some amount of control over the member firms to which they
have licensed their trademark.133 If such control creates an agency
relationship between the umbrella entity and member firms, the umbrella
entity could be exposed to vicarious liability for the actions of its member
firms under a “one firm” theory resting on agency law or controllingperson liability under Section 20(a). The largest network member might in
turn face similar liability if it controls the umbrella entity.
This possibility became reality for Deloitte in the Parmalat case.134
Parmalat appears to be an outlier, however. The great majority of cases on
this issue teach that that the failure of one network firm to meet its duty to
provide reasonable assurance against material misstatements in audited
financial statements does not impose vicarious liability on its umbrella
entity or on other network affiliates.135
Parmalat was a multinational Italian dairy corporation.136 In the
1990s, it needed large amounts of cash to cover losses in South America
and embezzlement by its chief executive officer and to service its debt.137
Together with its auditor, Grant Thornton S.p.A., it created a scheme of
fictitious transactions to hide its financial difficulties in order to obtain
more loans.138 But Italian law required Parmalat to rotate auditors in
1999.139 Parmalat moved the fictitious transactions to a Caribbean entity
for which Grant Thornton remained the auditor and hired Deloitte &
Touche, S.p.A. (Deloitte Italy) as its auditor.140
Deloitte Italy is the Italian member of the Deloitte accounting
network. Deloitte’s international umbrella entity was Deloitte Touche

131. Id.
132. See How We Are Structured: What is “PwC”?, PWC, http://www.pwc.com/structure (last
visited Jan. 1, 2013), for a description of the function of an umbrella entity and its relation to member
firms. Deloitte also has an English private company umbrella entity. About Deloitte, DELOITTE,
http://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/about-deloitte.html (last visited June
22, 2014).
133. Allen & Haverson, supra note 129, at 431–32.
134. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
135. See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
136. 594 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
137. Id. at 447–48.
138. Id. at 448.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Tohmatsu (DTT), a Swiss verein headquartered in New York alongside
Deloitte & Touche LLP (DT-US), Deloitte’s U.S. member firm.141 Despite
the scale of the fraud, which included forged bank statements showing
fictitious balances of several billion euros, Deloitte Italy continued to give
Parmalat unqualified audit opinions.142 Eventually, the scheme collapsed.
DTT, DT-US, and the chief executive officer of DTT, among others, were
sued in a securities class action in the Southern District of New York by
purchasers of Parmalat securities in the period for which Deloitte had
audited Parmalat.143 The plaintiffs argued that DTT and DT-US were
vicariously liable for Deloitte Italy’s actions under Rule 10b-5 through the
principle of respondeat superior, as well as under Section 20(a).144
The district court applied New York agency law to find that DTT had
a principal-agent relationship with Deloitte Italy. It found that DTT
exercised control in part because it controlled acceptance of client
engagements by member firms, arbitrated disputes between them, and set
policies and standards binding on the conduct of Deloitte Italy’s client
engagements.145 Citing Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Alitalia
Airlines, S.p.A., the court stated, “An agency relationship exists under New
York law when there is an agreement between the principal and the agent
that the agent will act for the principal, and the principal retains a degree of
control over the agent.”146
However, the elements presented in
Commercial Union Insurance Co. for such a relationship are “(1) the
principal’s manifestation of intent to grant authority to the agent . . . (2)
agreement by the agent. . . . [, and (3)] the principal must maintain control
over key aspects of the undertaking.”147 It is not obvious that DTT
manifested an intent to grant authority to Deloitte Italy or that Deloitte Italy
agreed to such a grant. The court’s opinion did not address this question
but instead focused on whether DTT controlled Deloitte Italy.

141. Id. at 447. A Swiss verein is a voluntary association form of legal entity intended for nonprofit organizations but available for commercial purposes. Megan E. Vetula, Note, From the Big Four
to Big Law: The Swiss Verein and the Global Law Firm, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1177, 1181 (2009).
It has limited liability among associates. Id. DTT is no longer a verein. Andrew Clark, Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu Quits Swiss System to Make UK Its New Legal Home, GUARDIAN, Sept. 20, 2010,
14:27 EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/sep/20/deloitte-touche-tohmatsu-legal-registrati
on-london.
142. 594 F. Supp. 2d at 447–48.
143. Id. at 449.
144. Id. at 447.
145. Id. at 455.
146. Id. at 451 (footnote omitted) (citing 347 F.3d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 2003); N.Y. Marine & Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Tradeline, LLC, 266 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 2001)).
147. 347 F.3d at 462.
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The court gave many examples of control over policy, public
relations, legal affairs, and intra-network dispute resolution.148 DTT had no
authority, however, to direct or supervise any audit engagement conducted
by any member firm.149 Had DTT been unhappy with a member firm’s
conduct of an audit, it perhaps could have sanctioned that member
according to the network agreements, but it could not have directed that the
audit be conducted differently. For this reason, the court’s finding on the
question of umbrella-entity liability was contrary to many recent Southern
District of New York decisions on the same question. In In re Asia Pulp
and Paper Securities Litigation, the Southern District of New York held
that Arthur Andersen’s international umbrella entity did not have control
over particular audits conducted by member firms; because it had no
control over the transactions at issue, it had no liability for them under
Section 20(a).150 In Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers
LLP, the Southern District of New York found that PwC’s global umbrella
entity was not alleged to have been involved with decisions about how
audit reports were completed and held that no principal-agent relationship
existed.151 In In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, the Southern
District of New York held that Arthur Andersen’s and KPMG’s respective
umbrella entities did not have principal-agent relationships with primaryviolator member firms because the umbrella entities lacked control over the
members’ business activities.152
The only case the Parmalat court cited against those contrary holdings
was a case in a Florida state court: Banco Espirito Santo International, Ltd.
v. BDO International, B.V.,153 which relied on Parker v. Domino’s Pizza,
Inc., a Florida decision concerning an automobile injury tort action.154 The
Parker court held that Domino’s Pizza had possibly created an agency
relationship with a franchisee because it had directed the franchisee’s daily

148. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53.
149. International umbrella entities do not practice accountancy. See, e.g., About Deloitte, supra
note 132 (stating that Deloitte’s umbrella entity “does not provide services to clients”). Searching for
Deloitte-branded registered auditors shows that Deloitte’s umbrella entity is not registered to provide
audit services even in its new UK domicile.
See REGISTER OF STATUTORY AUDITORS,
http://www.auditregister.org.uk/Forms/Default.aspx (last visited June 22, 2014).
150. 293 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
151. No. 03 Civ. 0613 GBD, 2004 WL 112948, at *3–6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004).
152. No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 WL 21488087, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003). Furthermore,
in two cases in the 1980s, the Southern District of New York rejected the agency theory presented in
Parmalat. See In re AM Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Reingold v. Deloitte
Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
153. 594 F. Supp. 2d at 453 n.63 (citing 979 So. 2d 1030, 1033–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
154. 979 So. 2d at 1034 (citing 629 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
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operations—particularly the acts of its drivers—in a substantial way.155
The applicability of Parker in the international accounting context is highly
questionable,156 and the several decisions in the Southern District of New
York on the question of vicarious liability within an international
accounting network are more persuasive than Banco Espirito Santo.157
The plaintiffs in Parmalat also argued that DTT had liability under
Section 20(a). Section 20(a) provides that persons
who, directly or indirectly, control[] any person liable . . . shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person . . . unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the [primary
violation].158

The defendants argued that Section 20(a) requires control not only of the
person but also of the transaction in question.159
The court found that DTT had liability under Section 20(a) on two
grounds. It held that “the plain language of Section 20(a), requires control
only of a person or entity liable under the chapter, not of the transaction
constituting the violation.”160 If true, there would have been Section 20(a)
liability since the court found that Deloitte Italy was an agent of DTT under
New York agency law. Yet the circuits are split on the test for Section
20(a) liability. The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits use the culpableparticipation test161 applied by the Southern District of New York in Anwar

155. See 629 So. 2d at 1027–28 (listing many examples of how Domino’s Pizza did direct the
activities of franchisees’ drivers).
156. The Middle District of Florida notably refused to apply Parker when a car rental franchise
was alleged to have provided a defective car in an automobile injury tort action, a fact pattern far closer
to Parker than that in Banco Espirito Santo. Estate of Miller v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 637 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1042 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
157. There are two cases that might have been cited in support of Parmalat but for the Second
Circuit’s rule against citing unpublished opinions from unrelated cases from before 2007, but these are
distinguished by their facts. See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. A.C.L.N., Ltd., No. 01 Civ. 11814(MP),
2003 WL 21058090 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2003) (allowing claims to proceed against BDO’s umbrella
entity where that entity was alleged to have signed the audit reports at issue); Cromer Fin. Ltd. v.
Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC), 2002 WL 826847 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002)
(permitting a suit to proceed where a specific conveyance of actual authority was alleged); see also
Colter Paulson, Case Management in the Sixth Circuit: Unpublished Opinions, SIXTH CIRCUIT APP.
BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/case-managementin-the-sixth-circuit-unpublished-opinions/ (describing the Second Circuit rule).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
159. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
160. Id. at 456 (citing In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 547, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
161. Erin L. Massey, Control Person Liability Under Section 20(a): Striking a Balance of Interests
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v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.,162 an action related to the Bernie Madoff Ponzi
scheme. There, the court held,
[T]he question of whether a plaintiff must plead culpable participation to
state a § 20(a) claim has, in this Court’s view, largely been settled by the
Second Circuit in numerous decisions, and that the weight of opinion of
district courts concurs with the standard previously articulated and
applied by this Court, the Court declines to apply Parmalat. Hence, in
order to plead control, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant had
actual control over the primary violator and transaction at issue.163

The culpable-participation test requires 1) that the defendant actually
controlled the primary violator and 2) that the defendant culpably
participated in the fraud.164 Other circuits apply the potential-control test
advanced by the Parmalat court.165 The most widely adopted version of
that standard requires 1) that the defendant exercised control “in general”
over the primary violator and 2) “possessed the power to control the
specific transaction upon which the primary violation is predicated.”166
Perhaps because its reading of Section 20(a) did run directly against
Second Circuit case law,167 the Parmalat court also held that DTT might
have had control of the transactions at issue (Deloitte Italy’s audit
opinions), so its liability under Section 20(a) did not hinge on whether
Section 20(a) requires such control.168 Under either test, however, Section
20(a) liability is dubious for the same reason that liability under a
respondeat superior theory is dubious: DTT lacked the ability to control
the conduct of any audit.
Plaintiffs also argued that DT-US had vicarious liability because it
controlled DTT.169 The court’s reasoning on this issue is tenuous. It found

for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 109, 114–15 (2005).
162. 728 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
163. Id. at 425 (citation omitted).
164. Massey, supra note 161, at 114–15.
165. Id. at 118.
166. Id. (quoting Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630–31 (8th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
167. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To establish
a prima facie case of control person liability, a plaintiff must show (1) a primary violation by the
controlled person, (2) control of the primary violator by the defendant, and (3) that the defendant was,
in some meaningful sense, a culpable participant in the controlled person’s fraud.” (emphasis added)).
The emphasized phrase originated in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
banc).
168. 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
169. Id. at 457.
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no dispositive facts supporting the allegation that DT-US controlled DTT.
It found only that DT-US partners held key leadership positions at DTT,
that DT-US provided a large portion of DTT’s funding, and that there had
been a single instance in which DT-US “may have influenced DTT’s
decision making” on an issue entirely unrelated to audit practice.170 This
was not a persuasive finding of a principal-agent relationship in the context
of a professional-services network. In such networks, it is very likely that
several affiliates will provide partners for key leadership positions at the
umbrella entity, will provide a large portion of its funding, and will
influence its decision-making.171
It is unlikely that the general
circumstances characteristic of a professional services network are also a
totality of circumstances establishing vicarious liability between affiliates.
This view is consistent with the other decisions of the Southern District of
New York.172
The decision in Parmalat to find vicarious liability under common law
and under Section 20(a) for Deloitte’s U.S. affiliate and for its umbrella
entity is an anomaly in recent case law on vicarious liability in accounting
networks. That Deloitte’s vicarious liability survived a motion to dismiss
can be seen as an aberration unlikely to have survived appeal. Under
existing law and in the absence of unusual facts, actions against one
affiliate will not result in liability for other affiliates or for the umbrella
entity.
IV. AUDITORS’ PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD
A variety of actors rely on management-prepared financial statements
to inform critical decisions: potential investors deciding whether to invest,
current investors deciding whether to divest or to change management,
financial institutions and trade suppliers deciding whether to extend credit

170. Id. at 458–59.
171. For example, all members of PwC’s Network Leadership Team, which “sets the strategy and
standards that the PwC network will follow” are senior partners of network affiliates with the exception
of the chairman, Dennis M. Nally, who was the senior partner of the U.S. affiliate prior to becoming
chairman of the global network. Governance Structures, PWC, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/corporategovernance/governance-structures.jhtml (last visited May 12, 2014); Network Leadership Team, PWC,
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/corporate-governance/network-leadership-team-governance-structure.jhtml
(last visited May 18, 2014); Dennis M. Nally, PWC, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/leadership/dennisnally.jhtml (last visited May 18, 2014).
172. See Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, No. 03 Civ. 0613 GBD, 2004
WL 112948, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004) (rejecting similar arguments that the U.S. affiliates of PwC
and Arthur Andersen had liability for their respective Peruvian network affiliates based on network
connections without alleging any fact that would definitely show control).
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and on what terms, current and potential customers or employees assessing
the company’s viability for doing business, and governments for
computation of taxes, among other users.173 Management has an incentive
to supply only the information that it considers to be in its interests to
supply, and market forces are unlikely to correct this in a timely fashion.174
Regulation must therefore oblige management to produce financial
statements that accurately provide the information needed by the users of
its financial statements.175
For public companies, a major form of such regulation is the
requirement of a financial statement audit, which is performed by CPAs
under promulgated standards. A financial statement audit obtains and
assesses evidence on whether a company’s financial statements fairly
represent its financial position.176 Such audits must be conducted in
accordance with GAAS.177 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as amended, requires
larger public companies in the United States to assess their internal controls
over financial reporting and requires auditors to attest to those
assessments.178
Thus, law and public policy reflect the expectation that auditors will
detect financial statement fraud. This Part will consider, first, whether this
is a reasonable expectation and, second, the history of the gap between this
expectation, which Chief Justice Burger described as a “‘public watchdog’
function,”179 and the auditing profession’s own view of its responsibility.
Over a century, reforms driven by accounting scandals have narrowed this
gap. Scandals involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies are yet another
episode in this history. Although the gap has narrowed—especially in the
past twenty years—auditors have in the process obtained legal protections
that effectively immunize them from liability for financial statement frauds
by U.S.-listed Chinese companies.

173. JOHN FLOWER WITH GABI EBBERS, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REPORTING 69–71 (2002).
174. Id. at 73.
175. Id. at 75.
176. BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21120, AUDITING AND ITS REGULATORS: REFORMS
AFTER ENRON 1–2 (2003).
177. Id. at 2.
178. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002 §
404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 § 989G(a) and Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 103 (2012).
179. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
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A. Is It Reasonable to Expect Auditors to Detect Financial Statement
Fraud?
Users of financial statements, such as investors, expect audits to
provide assurance against fraud. This expectation is reasonable because
investors have good reason to believe that a properly conducted audit
would detect major financial statement fraud.180 GAAS prescribe a
rigorous examination of the assertions made in a company’s financial
statements: an audit is more than a reconciliation of management-prepared
reports with management-maintained records.181 Auditors test details
underlying asset and liability balances and transactions for existence,
completeness, valuation, rights and obligations, and presentation.182 They
confirm bank balances with banks, receivables balances with customers,
count physical inventory, examine contracts and vendor invoices, and
confirm titles, among many other common tests, which, in one version of
the standard, number about two hundred.183 They perform analytical
procedures to identify implausible or unexpected balances or transactions
for scrutiny.184
The reliability of such audits in the U.S. market buttresses this
expectation’s reasonableness. One way to examine audit reliability is to
count financial restatements. A financial restatement is the release of a
previously-issued financial statement amended with new information
correcting a material inaccuracy in the previous statement.185 There is
obviously no measurement of never-discovered material misstatements, but

180. See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be
Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 762–63 (2012) (connecting the notion of reasonableness to
normative rules or principles and distinguishing between expectations supported by good reason and
those supported by a right grounded in a rule or principle).
181. See generally OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR AND THE CONDUCT OF
AN AUDIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUDITING STANDARDS, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 122, § 200 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2012) (presenting the
standards for the conduct of audits).
182. AUDIT EVIDENCE, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122, § 500 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 2012).
183. REPORTING ON INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 30,
§ 326 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1980).
184. ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122, § 520 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 2012).
185. See SUSAN SCHOLZ, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE CHANGING NATURE AND
CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC COMPANY FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS: 1997–2006, at 7 (2008), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/FinancialRestatements_1997_2006.
pdf, for the precise definition of a financial restatement event for purposes of the figures in this
discussion. Changes in financial statements for reasons other than previous misstatements, such as
adoption of new accounting standards, are not considered restatements. Id. Restatements of multiple
periods resulting from the same restatement event are considered one restatement. Id.
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a financial restatement indicates that at least one previous audit failed to
discover that the financial statements did not fairly represent the financial
position of the firm. In 2006, 6005 companies were listed on major
American securities exchanges,186 and those companies issued 594
restatements.187 Thus, about 10% of listed companies in 2006 restated their
financials for a prior period. This is a ten-fold increase from 1997, when
only sixty-nine of the 7617 companies then listed (or 0.9%) issued financial
restatements.188
However, the large increase in financial restatements from 1997 to
2006 resulted mostly from issues in accounting for expenses,189 largely
attributable to the implementation of internal control reporting under
Sarbanes-Oxley, changes in accounting treatments of leases and stock
options backdating, and the economic downturn following the end of the
technology bubble.190 It may also be due, in some degree, to more
conservative auditing following the accounting scandals related to Enron,
Global Crossing, and WorldCom.191 For U.S.-listed companies, fraud
restatements remain rare: twenty-one fraud restatements in 2006
(representing 0.3% of listed companies) compared to twenty in 1997.192 By
comparison, in China from 2000 to 2005, there were at least 271 fraud
restatements, representing 3.7% of all companies listed on the Shanghai
and Shenzhen exchanges.193
This low incidence of fraud restatements in the United States may
seem surprising, given U.S. limits on auditor liability. However, U.S.
markets have strong regulatory enforcement and place great value on
financial reporting quality. Such elements are absent in the case of U.S.-

186. Number of Listed Companies, WORLD FED’N EXCHANGES (2006), http://www.worldexchanges.org/statistics/annual/2006/number-listed-companies. Major American exchanges are defined
as the NYSE, NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange.
187. Scholz, supra note 185, at 2.
188. Id. at 31; Number of Companies with Shares Listed, WORLD FED’N EXCHANGES (1997),
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/1997/number-companies-shares-listed.
189. Scholz, supra note 185, at 31.
190. Id. at 2.
191. The audit firm in each of those scandals, Arthur Andersen, was quickly reduced from an
85,000-employee global accounting firm to a 150-employee business conference center outside of
Chicago. Ameet Sachdev, Conference Center Last Resort for Andersen, CHI. TRIB. (May 22, 2003),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0305220361may22,0,7603044.story.
192. Scholz, supra note 185, at 31.
193. Michael Firth et al., Cooking the Books: Recipes and Costs of Falsified Financial Statements
in China, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 371, 375 (2011). The number of such restatements in each year of the period
2000–2005 is highly variable. Id. Firth et al. examined a sample of 271 restatements resulting from
deliberate manipulation of financial statements, but the actual number of such restatements is likely
higher because financial services firms were excluded from the sample. Id. at 376.
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affiliated Chinese auditors auditing U.S.-listed companies, a situation in
which auditors’ professional standards of responsibility to detect fraud may
be investors’ only protection.
B. The Expectations Gap
Investors reasonably expect auditors to detect fraud, but auditors have
historically disclaimed a responsibility to do so. Certainly, financial
statements are the representations of management, not of the auditor. Yet
every user of financial statements relies on the auditor’s opinion as some
degree of assurance against fraud.194 This divergence between expected
and accepted responsibility to detect fraud creates an expectations gap.
Historically, the auditing profession has responded to this gap by
attempting to lower expectations. But, as discussed below, these
expectations drive much of the demand for auditors’ services.195
In the 1910s and 1920s, auditor’s reports certified the balance sheet as
correct.196 Although not required by law, audits were seen as the primary
means of detecting fraud in financial statements.197 Then, in 1931,
Ultramares exposed auditors to liability to third parties relying on the
auditor’s report for fraudulent misrepresentation if the auditors “acted
without information leading to a sincere or genuine belief.”198 The
auditor’s report at issue in Ultramares was a “Certificate of Auditors,”
issued for 1923, that “certif[ied]” the balance sheet and “further certif[ied]”
that it presented “a true and correct view of the financial condition” of Fred
Stern & Company.199 Stern had fraudulently overstated its accounts
receivable and other assets and had used the auditor’s certification of the

194. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 49 (1987).
195. For example, after the Enron and Global Crossing bankruptcies, Congress enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to address concerns about the accuracy of public companies’ financial disclosures.
H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 18 (2002). The Act does this, in part, by requiring public companies to
obtain an additional service from auditors: independent attestations of the companies’ internal controls
over financial reporting. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (SarbanesOxley) Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 989G(a) and Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 103 (2012).
By 2004, total audit fees for S&P 500 companies had increased by 103% from their 2001 levels. Jack
T. Ciesielski & Thomas R. Weirich, Ups and Downs of Audit Fees Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPA
J., Oct. 2006, at 28, 29, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2006/1006/essentials/p28.htm
(excluding four companies due to lack of available information).
196. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., ACAP COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION RELATING
TO THE AUDITOR’S REPORTING MODEL 4 (2010).
197. Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part I, 17
ACCT. HORIZONS 189, 190–91 (2003).
198. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
199. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 442 (N.Y. 1931).
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overstated assets to obtain loans.200 In finding auditor liability to the lender
possible under a theory of fraudulent misrepresentation, Chief Judge
Cardozo focused heavily on the word “certified.”201 In response to the
Ultramares case, “certify” disappeared, and “guarantee” changed to
“opinion” in the auditor’s report language that was made mandatory for
NYSE-listed companies in 1934.202
In response to the 1929 market crash, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 required all registrants to have their financial statements audited by an
independent CPA.203 During the hearings on the Securities Act of 1933, a
proposal to assign the external audit function to a government agency had
been rejected—largely through the efforts of the president of the New York
State Society of Certified Public Accountants—in favor of requiring audits
by private CPA firms.204 Thus, instead of creating a new regulatory
agency, a public regulatory function was delegated as an exclusive
franchise to accountants certified by a private institution and employed at
private firms.
In response to the McKesson & Robbins auditing scandal in 1939, this
private institution, the American Institute of Accountants (AIA, now the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or AICPA), began to
issue bulletins establishing auditing procedures.205 McKesson & Robbins
perpetrated a financial statement fraud by overstating its accounts
receivable and inventory.206 The auditor, Price, Waterhouse & Co., failed
to detect this fraud because its auditing procedures did not test these
items.207 The AIA, having resisted a government takeover of auditing only
five years earlier, quickly responded by incorporating the performance of
these tests into the professional standards for auditors.208
The AIA adopted a set of standards constituting GAAS in 1948.209
Standards of Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 30, adopted in 1951 (restated
in 1960), disclaimed the responsibility to detect fraud. It stated that a
financial statement audit “cannot be relied upon[] to disclose defalcations
200. Id. at 443.
201. Id. at 448 (“The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that the balance
sheet was in accordance with the books of account. If their statement was false, they are not to be
exonerated because they believed it to be true.” (emphasis added)).
202. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 196, at 4.
203. Zeff, supra note 197, at 192.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 193.
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and other similar irregularities” and that assurance against fraud should
instead be sought from “good internal control and fidelity bonds.”210 It also
stated that an audit “cannot be relied upon to assure” the “discovery of
deliberate misrepresentation by management” and that the “responsibility
of the independent auditor for failure to detect fraud . . . arises only when
such failure clearly results from noncompliance with generally accepted
auditing standards.”211 This language limits the auditor’s responsibility to
assuring that the financial statements fairly summarize the financial records
of the audited company. It encountered contemporaneous objection.212
Certainly, “good internal control” is better suited to the detection of frauds
such as defalcations by employees than the periodic audit of financial
statements, but audits are expected to discover at least some types or
magnitudes of fraud. In Ultramares, Chief Judge Cardozo’s criticism of a
failure to test receivables213 reflected the clear expectation that an auditor
should be held responsible for detecting some frauds if the audit itself is not
to be deemed a fraud. After the McKesson scandal, testing receivables and
inventory was made a professional responsibility precisely because auditors
are expected to discover “deliberate management misrepresentation” of
those assets.
Nonetheless, this language was repeated in the AICPA’s superseding
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1 in 1972.214 In the late 1960s,
decisions by the Southern District of New York in Fischer v. Kletz,215
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,216 and United States v. Simon217 had

210. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR IN THE EXAMINATION OF
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 30, ¶¶ 5–6 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1960).
211. Id. ¶ 5.
212. See, e.g., R. K. MAUTZ & HUSSEIN A. SHARAF, THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUDITING 117 (1961)
(“As a profession, independent auditing must accept appropriate responsibility, and it should do so in a
positive and courageous fashion. One can have considerable sympathy with the profession’s wish to
avoid painful and expensive litigation yet believe that a more straightforward acceptance of
responsibility is desirable.”).
213. 174 N.E. 441, 443–44 (N.Y. 1931) (finding that an auditor examining Stern’s accounts
receivable “would have found invoices, seventeen in number, which amounted in the aggregate to the
interpolated item, but scrutiny of these invoices would have disclosed suspicious features in that they
had no shipping number nor a customer’s order number and varied in terms of credit and in other
respects from those usual in the business”).
214. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 1, §§ 110.05–.08 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972).
215. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that an auditor could be liable for a breach of duty
to investors for failure to disclose information acquired after audit completion).
216. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (denying an auditor’s affirmative due diligence defense
against liability for misleading financial statements in a registration statement).
217. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming the district court’s criminal fraud conviction of three
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greatly increased auditors’ litigation exposure.218 Simon, especially, was a
blow to auditors’ efforts to limit their liability for financial statement fraud.
In Simon, three auditors were held criminally liable for securities fraud and
mail fraud for certifying a misleading financial statement.219 On review,
the Second Circuit held that auditors could face criminal liability for
attesting to materially misleading financial statements if the jury could
reasonably infer that the auditors had acted in bad faith despite technical
compliance with GAAS and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP).220 Three years later, the AICPA lost its GAAP rulemaking role
with the creation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).221
In 1973, only one year after SAS No. 1, Equity Funding Corporation
of America collapsed222 after the disclosure of accounting fraud so massive
that the company had dedicated a mainframe computer system exclusively
to fictitious transactions.223 Nonetheless, the auditors had attested to the
financial statements, and the fraud had gone undisclosed until an exemployee tipped off a securities analyst.224 Three auditors were convicted
of fraud and sentenced to prison for failure to report evidence of the
fraud.225
The AICPA responded to this and other pressures226 in 1977 with SAS
No. 16, which superseded SAS No. 1, sections 110.05–.08.227 The
disclaimer of responsibility from 1951 was replaced with ambiguous

auditors who had certified the fraudulent financial statements of Continental Vending Machine Corp.).
218. Zeff, supra note 197, at 197.
219. 425 F.2d at 798.
220. Id. at 805. Certiorari was denied on March 30, 1970. Simon v. United States, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970). President Nixon pardoned the defendants on December 20, 1972. See Wallace Turner, Rebozo
Identified as Helping Nixon to Buy Coast Land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1973, at 1 (reporting concerns
about the selection of the pardoned defendants’ former firm, Coopers & Lybrand, to confirm the source
of funding for the President’s purchase of estates in California and Florida, then under investigation by
the Ervin committee).
221. Zeff, supra note 197, at 198. FASB was created because of a general sense that auditors were
representing the interests of their clients, rather than the public, in GAAP standard-setting. Id.
222. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650 (1983).
223. Rick Stelnick, Mainframe: Madoff-Size Money, Monstrous Misapplication, DECODED SCI.
(Nov. 5, 2011), http://www.decodedscience.com/mainframe-madoff-size-money-monstrous-misapplicat
ion-loop/4927.
224. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
225. Three Auditors Get Jail in Equity Funding Case, WALL ST. J., Jul. 17, 1975, at 31.
226. Such pressures included other accounting scandals, the Metcalf Committee, enactment of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and a threat of more SEC regulation of auditing. Roland L. Madison,
SAS #82: Sword or Shield?, NAT’L PUB. ACCT., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 20.
227. See THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETECTION OF ERRORS OR
IRREGULARITIES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1977).
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language stating that the users of financial statements provide themselves
with reasonable assurance against material misstatements by looking “to
entities’ controls,” which include legal requirements, corporate governance,
and internal accounting controls, “together with independent audits.”228
SAS No. 16 further qualified auditors’ responsibilities by disclaiming
responsibility to verify the completeness of the entity’s records or to verify
confirmations made by third parties.229
Dissatisfaction with auditors’ resistance to accepting responsibility for
detecting financial statement fraud continued in the 1980s with yet more
accounting scandals.230 In 1985, Congressman John Dingell publicly
questioned “whether the S.E.C.’s delegation of its statutory authority [to
establish standards used in audits] to self-interested private parties has
adequately fulfilled the commission’s mandate to protect the public
interest.”231 In 1987, the Treadway Commission recommended that GAAS
“should be changed to recognize better the independent public accountant’s
responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting” and that the
body issuing GAAS should include not only public accountants but also an
equal number of persons “whose primary concern is with the use of
auditing products.”232
The AICPA quickly responded by issuing SAS No. 53 in February
1988.233 Where SAS No. 1 had said that an audit “cannot be relied upon to
assure” discovery of “deliberate misrepresentation by management,” SAS
No. 53 stated that an audit should be able to provide “reasonable
assurance” against financial statement fraud.234 Risk factors for fraud were
identified.235 The standard also attempted to lower expectations by
qualifying “reasonable assurance” to exclude frauds involving forgery or
collusion with third parties.236

228. Id. ¶ 4.
229. Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
230. E.g., Penn Square, United American Bank, Drysdale Government Securities, Continental
Illinois, and E.S.M. Government Securities. Michael S. Raab, Detecting and Preventing Financial
Statement Fraud: The Roles of the Reporting Company and the Independent Auditor, 5 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 514, 517 n.14 (1987).
231. John D. Dingell, Who Audits the Auditors?: Congress Should Be the Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1985, at F2.
232. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, supra note
194, at 13.
233. THE AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITY TO DETECT AND REPORT ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988).
234. Id. ¶ 5.
235. Id. ¶¶ 10–13.
236. Id. ¶ 7.
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Nonetheless, dissatisfaction continued. At the annual conference of
the New York Society of CPAs in 1992, Assistant Comptroller General
Donald Chapin “raised the specter of possible action by Congress to
regulate the profession, and he warned the profession against continuing to
close the expectation gap by reducing expectations.”237 He went on to say,
“Expectations [of auditors] are so unbelievably low that some are
questioning whether there is a role for a private sector profession. . . .
[T]he profession’s traditional function has been downgraded to a loss
leader.”238
Major audit firms, facing saturation of the market for their audit
services, found rapid growth opportunities in non-audit consulting
services.239 They accordingly became even more sensitive to litigation risk
from “loss leader” auditing services. In the 1990s, they further insulated
themselves from liability when limited liability partnerships became
available240 and when the PSLRA both heightened pleading standards for
Rule 10b-5 actions and limited joint and several liability to defendants who
knowingly violate securities laws.241 The auditing profession lobbied
vigorously for the PSLRA’s protections from shareholder actions.242
Congress overrode President Clinton’s veto to pass the PSLRA, but the
auditors paid a price for this level of support: they were required to search
for fraud.243 Title III of the PSLRA requires audits to include procedures to
provide reasonable assurance of detecting material fraud, to identify
material related-party transactions, and to evaluate any doubts about the
audited company as a going concern.244 So, shortly after the enactment of
the PSLRA, the AICPA replaced SAS No. 53 with a new standard, SAS
No. 82,245 which slightly strengthened SAS No. 53’s language. It stated
than an auditor is able to obtain reasonable assurance against financial

237. Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part II, 17
ACCT. HORIZONS 267, 276 (2003).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 277–79.
240. In 1992, when the AICPA changed Rule 505 of its Code of Professional Conduct to allow
members to practice under any legal organization, only two states allowed LLPs. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT
Addendum to Prefatory Note at 4 (1997). When LLPs were added to the Uniform Partnership Act in
1996, “over forty” states allowed them. Id.
241. § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012).
242. Zeff, supra note 237, at 278.
243. Abraham J. Briloff, The Private Securities Litigation Reform from a Critical Accountant’s
Perspective, 10 CRITICAL PERSP. ON ACCT. 267, 275 (1999).
244. § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012).
245. CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 82 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1997).
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statement fraud246 and went into some detail to define “due professional
care,” “professional skepticism,” and “reasonable assurance.”247 It also
repeated the qualifications concerning forgery and collusion.248
The major accounting scandals in 2001 and 2002 made this a shortlived standard. In response to the Enron and Global Crossing scandals, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the PCAOB.249 Every auditor of public
companies must register with the PCAOB and comply with its rules and
oversight.250 In the same month that the first PCAOB members were
appointed, SAS No. 99 superseded SAS No. 82.251 It required auditors to
gather and consider much more information than prior standards, and it
required auditors to take initiative in identifying, considering, and
responding to fraud risks.252 The expectations gap persists, however,
despite these reforms. Members of the PCAOB are divided between
auditors (and accounting academics) and financial community users of
financial statements.253 The PCAOB still struggles with defining auditor
responsibility, while the financial community remains dissatisfied.254
A century of accounting scandals forced the auditing profession to
move from a disclaimer of responsibility to a qualified acceptance of
responsibility for “reasonable assurance” against fraudulent misstatements,
but in exchange auditors obtained, in LLPs and the PSLRA, protection
from liability when they fail to provide such assurance. As seen in the
Longtop case, these protections, combined with judicial unwillingness to
infer scienter, give auditors near-immunity from investor claims arising
from China-based financial-statement frauds, even when those frauds must
246. Id. app. B ¶ 10.
247. Id. app. B.
248. Id. app. B ¶ 12.
249. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750–53 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
250. Id.
251. CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 99 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002). This was superseded by SAS No.
122 on December 15, 2012, as part of the AICPA’s Clarity Project to clarify audit standards and
converge U.S. GAAS with international standards on auditing. See STATEMENTS ON AUDITING
STANDARDS: CLARIFICATION AND RECODIFICATION, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2012).
252. CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT, supra note 251, ¶¶ 11–36.
253. See Sarah Johnson, What Is the Auditor’s Role in Finding Fraud?, CFO, Apr. 13, 2010,
http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2010/04/what-is-the-auditors-role-in-finding-fraud/ (noting that in
response to a Treasury Department advisory group’s recommendation, the PCAOB’s advisory group,
except for its investor members, “generally refrained from recommending” more detailed audits, citing
complexity and the possibility of increased liability).
254. See id. (quoting PCAOB member Charles Niemeier) (“Investors are not satisfied with the
status quo . . . and I think that is justified . . . .”).
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have been obvious to a diligent auditor. A century of accounting scandals
has not made courts more likely to infer the scienter necessary for auditor
liability. Instead, a persistent expectations gap about the usefulness of
audits for detecting fraud has, ironically, helped to create a judicial
presumption that auditors who fail to discover even flagrant financial
statement frauds are not reckless but simply, in the words of the Longtop
court, “duped.”
V. CANADIAN REGULATION: A SUCCESS STORY
Canada does not have a national securities regulator.255 Instead, each
Canadian province has its own securities regulator. Because of the primacy
of the Toronto Stock Exchange in the Canadian capital market, the Ontario
Securities Commission is the most important Canadian securities
regulator.256 The common law of negligent misrepresentation, however, is
controlled by the Supreme Court of Canada.257 The court had once
recognized that auditors owe investors a duty of care because of auditors’
“public watchdog” role,258 but in the late 1990s, echoing then-Chief Judge
Cardozo’s concern for imposing on auditors “liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class,”259 the court
concluded that shareholders can sue negligent auditors only through a
derivative action.260
255. Efforts to establish a federal securities regulator are ongoing. See Canadian Securities
Regulation Regime Transition Office Act, S.C. 2009, c. 2, § 297 (establishing an office to lead the
transition to a national securities regulator).
256. Ronald J. Daniels & Edward J. Waitzer, Challenges to the Citadel: A Brief Overview of
Recent Trends in Canadian Corporate Governance, 23 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 23, 29–30 (1994).
257. In Canada, auditors can be sued under a theory of either or both negligent misrepresentation
or negligence simpliciter. In negligence simpliciter, “the duty of care is based solely upon proximity or
‘neighbourship’ in the Atkinian sense.” Wooldridge v. Sumner, [1963] 2 Q.B. 43 at 69 (Diplock L.J.)
(Eng.). A negligent misrepresentation action, unlike a negligence simpliciter action, allows recovery of
pure economic losses. Negligent Misrepresentation vs. Negligence Simpliciter, LITIG. NOTES (Bersenas
Jacobsen Chouest Thomson Blackburn LLP, Toronto, Ont., Can.), Jan. 2012, at 1, available at
http://www.lexcanada.com/data/LitigationNotes_Vol7-1.pdf.
Under a theory of negligent
misrepresentation, however, plaintiffs must show reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation. Id.
Under Canadian law this makes class certification in negligent misrepresentation actions difficult to
achieve because reliance must be established individually for each class member. Id. However, it is
less difficult when there is a strong claim of fraud against the issuer itself. See Ward K. Branch & Paul
Miller, Securities Class Actions and Secondary Liability in Canada: A New Day Dawning?, in
SECURITIES LAW: ADVANCED ISSUES—2009, § 1.2.7 (Continuing Legal Educ. Soc’y of B.C. ed., 2009),
available at https://www.cle.bc.ca/PracticePoints/BUS/securities%20class%20actions.pdf.
Major
China-based securities frauds do present strong fraud claims; therefore, this Note does not address
reliance issues in achieving class certification.
258. See infra Part V.A.
259. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
260. See infra Part V.A.
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Dissatisfaction with this evolution of tort law and reaction to U.S.
reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act motivated Ontario to enact the
Budget Measures Act,261 an amendment to the Ontario Securities Act
(OSA)262 and other statutes. Like Sarbanes-Oxley, the Budget Measures
Act granted regulators enhanced oversight powers over auditors and
required issuers to certify their internal controls.263 But more importantly,
it introduced statutory civil liability for continuous disclosure in the
secondary market in Ontario.264 And while the U.S. regulatory and liability
regimes have struggled to protect investors from China-based securities
frauds, this new liability for continuous disclosure has been rather
effective. The contrast between the outcomes of the frauds involving
Longtop and Sino-Forest is nothing short of breathtaking. SEC and
PCAOB efforts to regulate Deloitte in China have been ineffective:
Longtop investors received nothing, and Longtop’s auditor paid nothing.
Meanwhile, in Canada, Ernst & Young was compelled to offer $117
million to settle claims arising from the Sino-Forest fraud.265
A. The Development of Canadian Tort Law on Auditor Liability
Auditor liability for negligent misrepresentation is a more recent
concept in British and Canadian law than in American law, and, as in the
United States, it is a concept built, in part, on the opinions of Benjamin
Cardozo. In 1932, Donoghue v. Stevenson266 removed the requirement of
privity in English and Scots negligence actions.267 Before that case,
remedy for injuries arising from defective products that were not inherently
dangerous had been available through actions for breach of the contract of
sale.268 The plaintiff, Mrs. Donoghue, had no contractual relationship with
the seller or manufacturer of the ginger beer containing the infamous
Paisley snail.269 The House of Lords nonetheless held that she had a cause

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Keeping the Promise for a Strong Economy Act (Budget Measures), S.O. 2002, c. 22.
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5.
Id. §§ 143(1)25, 143(1)57–61.
Id. pt. XXIII.1.
Jeff Gray, Ontario Court Approves $117-Million Settlement with Sino-Forest Auditors,
GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 21, 2013, 1:48 PM EDT, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
industry-news/the-law-page/ontario-court-approves-117-million-settlement-with-sino-forestauditors/article10044252.
266. [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
267. Abed Awad, Comment, The Concept of Defect in American and English Products Liability
Discourse: Despite Strict Liability Linguistics, Negligence is Back with a Vengeance!, 10 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 275, 283 (1998).
268. Id.
269. [1932] A.C. at 562.
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of action against the manufacturer.270 The most expansive opinion in the
case was that of Lord Atkin:
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure . . . . persons who are so
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind
to the acts or omissions which are called in question.271

In support of his opinion, Lord Atkin referred to Cardozo’s opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,272 which, eighteen years earlier, had
removed the requirement of privity in New York negligence actions and “in
which [Cardozo] states the principles of the law as I [Atkin] should desire
to state them.”273 But Donoghue only concerned physical damage resulting
from negligence. The remedy for economic losses from reliance on
misstatements remained in contract law, which, of course, required privity
of contract.
In 1951, Sir Alfred Denning (later Lord Denning) argued for the
extension of Donoghue to expose auditors to third-party liability for their
negligent misstatements. In Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., Henry
Fraser was persuaded to invest £2000 in a mining concern on the basis of
certified accounts that “gave an altogether false picture of the position of
the company” because “there was no verification whatever by the
accountants of the information which they were given.”274 The case turned
on whether the auditors owed a duty of care to Fraser. Lord Denning
argued in dissent that, under Donoghue, they did. He reasoned that
accountants, as “persons who engage in a calling which requires special
knowledge and skill,” do owe a duty of care because “it is the duty of every
artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly.”275 They owe this duty to their
employer and “to any third person to whom . . . they know their employer
is going to show the accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take
some other action.”276 But, citing Ultramares, he argued that this duty does
not extend to persons to whom the audited company shows the accounts

270. Id.
271. Id. at 580.
272. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
273. Donoghue, [1932] A.C. at 598.
274. [1951] 2 K.B. 164 at 168 (Eng.).
275. Id. at 180 (quoting ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, LA NOVELLE NATURA BREVIUM 94D (1534))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
276. Id. at 180–81.
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without the accountants’ knowledge.277 In 1964, in Hedley Byrne & Co. v.
Heller & Partners Ltd., the House of Lords overruled the Candler majority
and adopted Lord Denning’s dissent.278
Canadian law also adopted Lord Denning’s dissent. Haig v. Bamford
involved audited financial statements that induced Gordon Haig to invest
cash and loan guarantees in a company.279 Despite his investment, the
company began to suffer cash flow problems.280 Subsequent investigation
showed that a prepayment had been improperly presented in the financial
statements as revenue and should have been presented as a deferred
revenue liability.281 In fact, the company had not been not profitable at all:
it was soon after liquidated by its creditors.282 Haig sued the auditors of the
financial statements.283 The Supreme Court of Canada held that the auditor
did owe a duty of care under tort law.284 This duty rested not only on an
ancient right of the public to expect experts to exercise their expertise
“rightly and truly” but more importantly on the public role played by
auditors in the modern economy. For the majority, Justice Dickson held
that
The increasing growth and changing role of corporations in modern
society has been attended by a new perception of the societal role of the
profession of accounting. The day when the accountant served only the
owner-manager of a company and was answerable to him alone has
passed. The complexities of modern industry combined with the effects
of specialization, the impact of taxation, urbanization, the separation of
ownership from management, the rise of professional corporate
managers, and a host of other factors, have led to marked changes in the
role and responsibilities of the accountant, and in the reliance which the
277. Id. at 183 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1932)) (“[I]t would be
going too far to make an accountant liable to any person in the land who chooses to rely on the accounts
in matters of business, for that would expose him to ‘liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’”).
278. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) 502–03 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“I
consider that it follows and that it should now be regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a
special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another
person who relies upon such skill, a duty of care will arise. . . . Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a
person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to
make careful inquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his
information or advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will place
reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.”).
279. (1976), [1977] 1 S.C.R 466, 469.
280. Id. at 470.
281. Id. at 470–71.
282. Id. at 471.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 483–84.
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public must place upon his work. The financial statements of the
corporations upon which he reports can affect the economic interests of
the general public as well as of shareholders and potential
shareholders.285

The Supreme Court of Canada thus held—as the U.S. Supreme Court
would hold eight years later286—that auditors owe a duty of care because of
their “public watchdog” role: they are licensed to perform what is
essentially a public regulatory function.
The court then inquired into the “proximity” of this duty. The use of
“proximity” there originated in Lord Denning’s dissent: to avoid the
unlimited liability that concerned Chief Judge Cardozo in Ultramares,
there must be something more than reliance to link the injured party to the
auditor.287 Lord Denning’s proximity test asked whether “the accountants
[knew] that the accounts were required for submission to the [investor] for
use by him.”288 The Supreme Court of Canada, recognizing the public role
of auditors, rejected this narrow proximity test. Instead, it held that when
auditors prepare financial statements to guide a “specific class of persons”
in a “specific class of transactions,” they may be liable when that class of
persons relies on their statements in engaging in that class of
transactions.289 The statements at question in Haig were prepared before
Haig was known to be a possible investor.290 The auditors in Haig knew,
however, that the statements had been intended for a specific class of
persons and a specific class of transactions: the “end and aim” of the
statements had been to secure equity investors.291 Therefore, the auditors
could be liable to Haig, a member of the class of persons who had relied on
the financial statements in making an equity investment.292

285. Id. at 475–76.
286. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
287. [1977] 1 S.C.R. at 476–77 (citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 441 (1932)).
288. Id. at 477 (quoting Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 at 181 (Denning
L.J.) (Eng.)).
289. Id. at 478 (quoting Candler, [1951] 2 K.B. at 184 (Denning L.J.)).
290. Id. at 470.
291. Id. at 478, 482. The “end and aim” phrase is adopted from yet another Cardozo opinion:
Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y. 1922).
292. Id. at 483; see also Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87, 110 (“[T]he doctrine of Hedley
Byrne is well established in Canada . . . . The decisions of this Court . . . suggest five general
requirements: (1) there must be a duty of care based on a ‘special relationship’ between the representor
and the representee; (2) the representation in question must be untrue, inaccurate, or misleading; (3) the
representor must have acted negligently in making said misrepresentation; (4) the representee must have
relied, in a reasonable manner, on said negligent misrepresentation; and (5) the reliance must have been
detrimental to the representee in the sense that damages resulted.”).
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Potential equity investors constitute a very large class of persons: the
investing world at large. Liability to the world at large creates the
possibility of liability out of proportion to fault. Thus, very shortly after
Haig, the House of Lords expanded the proximity test: the Anns test asks
first whether there is sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and
defendant to create a prima facie duty of care and second whether there are
policy considerations that negate this prima facie duty of care.293 Although
the House of Lords overruled Anns in 1991,294 the Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed it in 1997 in Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst &
Young.295
In Hercules, shareholders alleged that they had relied on negligent
audit reports when investing in a company that subsequently went
bankrupt.296 The court held that, although rejected by the House of Lords,
the Anns test had been adopted in Canadian law.297 The Canadian Anns test
asks,
(1) is there a sufficiently close relationship between the parties (the
[defendant] and the [plaintiff]) so that, in the reasonable contemplation
of the [defendant], carelessness on its part might cause damage to that
person? If so,
(2) are there any considerations which ought to negative or limit (a) the
scope of the duty and (b) the class of persons to whom it is owed or (c)
the damages to which a breach of it may give rise?298

The court held that the auditors did owe a prima facie duty of care to the
plaintiffs because their reliance on the audit reports was both reasonable
and foreseeable.299

293. Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.) 751–52 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
294. Murphy v. Brentwood Dist. Council, [1991] 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
Arguably, Anns had earlier been rejected in the auditing context by Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman,
[1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). See Jack Blackier & Mindy Paskell-Mede, Auditor
Liability in Canada: The Past, Present, and Future, 48 U.N.B.L.J. 65, 71–73 (1999) (discussing the
relation between Anns and Caparo Industries).
295. [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165. For a discussion of the divergence between the House of Lords and the
Supreme Court of Canada, see Blackier & Paskell-Mede, supra note 280.
296. Hercules, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 175.
297. See id. at 184 (“It is now well established in Canadian law that the existence of a duty of care
in tort is to be determined through an application of the two-part test first enunciated by Lord
Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council.”).
298. City of Kamloops v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 10–11.
299. Hercules, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 200 (“[T]here can be no question that a prima facie duty of care
was owed to the appellants by the respondents on the facts of this case.”).
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The second prong of the Anns test seeks to avoid liability out of
proportion to fault by limiting the scope of the duty identified in the first
prong.300 The author of the unanimous majority opinion in Hercules,
Justice La Forest, worried that exposing auditors to a broad duty of care
would increase insurance costs, increase the time required to produce
financial reports, and, ultimately, reduce the availability of auditing
services.301 So he limited the scope of liability by limiting the purpose for
which audit statements should be used: “the only purpose for which the
[audit] reports could have been used in such a manner as to give rise to a
duty of care on the part of the [auditor] is as a guide for the shareholders, as
a group, in supervising or overseeing management.”302 He distinguished
Hercules from Haig by noting that in Haig the audit report in question had
been prepared for the specific purpose of securing investors, whereas the
reports in Hercules had been general annual reports.303 Applying the rule
of Foss v. Harbottle,304 the court concluded that shareholders can sue
negligent auditors only through a derivative action.305
B. The Ontario Securities Act: Part XXIII.1
In the 1990s, auditors in the United States obtained major protections
from liability to investors with the introduction of the LLP and the
enactment of the PSLRA.306 Similarly, in the 1990s, auditors in Canada
raised the specter of unlimited liability to avoid liability to investors who
rely on their work. The Hercules court’s conclusion that shareholders
should not rely on audited financial statements drew a sharp reaction.307
300. See id. at 202 (“[W]ere auditors such as the respondents held to owe a duty of care to
plaintiffs in all cases where the first branch of the Anns/Kamloops test was satisfied, the problem of
indeterminate liability would normally arise.”).
301. Grace Hession, Auditor Independence and Liability in Canada: Are We Ready for Third Party
Liability?, 36 U.B.C. L. REV. 575, 606 (2003).
302. Hercules, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 207–08.
303. Id. at 191.
304. (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that for wrongs alleged to
have been done to a corporation, the proper claimant is the corporation itself).
305. Hercules, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 211–14. Additionally, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held
that Hercules Management had foreclosed any “fraud on the market” theory for secondary market
claims and that reliance must be established in all cases alleging negligent misrepresentation. Carom v.
Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (1998), 41 O.R. 3d 780 (Can. Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).
306. See supra Part III.
307. See, e.g., Philip Mathias, Auditors Not Legally Liable to Investors, Top Court Rules, FIN.
POST (Toronto), May 24, 1997, § 1, at 3 (quoting York University Professor Al Rosen) (“The annual
financial statement is now a joke. . . . Who really needs an audit of financial statements that are not
useful for investor decision-making?”); Need New Securities Law That Holds Auditors Liable, Editorial,
FIN. POST., May 27, 1997, § 1, at 18 (“Provincial governments should quickly establish new securities
law that makes a negligent auditor liable when investors lose money after relying on a company’s
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Soon thereafter, and in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the
United States, Ontario introduced an amendment to the OSA, which,
among other things, created civil liability for secondary market disclosures,
codified at Part XXIII.1 of the OSA.308 Previously, the OSA had imposed
statutory liability only for misrepresentation in a prospectus, offering
memorandum, or circular.309 Part XXIII.1 allows investors to sue the issuer
of a security and other responsible parties—specifically including
auditors—if they acquire or dispose of the issuer’s securities during a
period when there is an uncorrected misrepresentation in a statement or
document released by the issuer or during a period in which the issuer fails
to make a timely disclosure of a material change.310 Investors do not have
to demonstrate actual reliance on such misrepresentations to seek
damages.311
Part XXIII.1 provides a statutory scheme for calculating investor
damages, including a provision for compensation for unrealized losses.312
But damages are limited. There is a proportionate liability scheme: where
there are multiple defendants, such as an auditor and the audited company,
each defendant is liable only for the portion of the damages corresponding
to that defendant’s relative responsibility for those damages, except that
defendants who meet an elevated scienter requirement in misrepresentation
have joint and several liability with all other defendants who meet that
scienter requirement.313 There are also statutory caps on damages, except
for defendants who meet the elevated scienter requirement.314 An auditor’s
liability is limited to the greater of C$1 million or the revenue earned from
the issuer and its affiliates in the twelve months preceding the
misrepresentation.315 Damages paid by defendants in related actions in
other Canadian jurisdictions are creditable against the Ontario liability
cap.316
audited financial statements.”).
308. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, pt. XXIII.1. The Act was initially introduced in the
Ontario Legislative Assembly as Bill 198 on October 30, 2002, and after a convoluted legislative
process, Part XXIII.1 was proclaimed into force on December 30, 2005. Michael J. Willis, Market
Reaction to the Introduction of Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Evidence from Canada 8–10 (Dec.
20, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law).
309. Id. pt. XXIII.
310. Id. pt. XXIII.1, § 138.3.
311. Id. § 138.1.
312. Id. § 138.5.
313. Id. § 138.6.
314. Id. § 138.7.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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Thus, a plaintiff suing an auditor under Part XXIII.1 has two options.
If the plaintiff does not allege scienter, then he or she only need show that
the financial statements contained a misrepresentation. But in such cases,
the auditor’s liability is proportionate to the auditor’s level of fault and in
any event capped at the greater of C$1 million or one year’s audit fees. Or,
if the plaintiff can show that the auditor acted with scienter, there is no
limit to liability. To show scienter, the plaintiff must prove that the auditor
“authorized, permitted or acquiesced” in or influenced the making of the
misrepresentation while “knowing” that it was a misrepresentation.317
Part XXIII.1 provides several statutory defenses. The defenses most
relevant to auditors of financial statements are: (1) an exemption from
liability for forward-looking information, such as pro forma financial
statements, if that information includes certain cautionary language and (2)
a reasonable investigation, or due diligence, defense.318 The due diligence
defense bars liability where an auditor can prove that it conducted a
reasonable investigation and that it had no reasonable grounds to believe
that there was a misrepresentation.319 This is an affirmative defense:
auditors are presumptively liable for misrepresentations and bear the
burden of proving the due diligence of their audits.320
Finally, Part XXIII.1 suits cannot commence without leave of the
court.321 The court must be satisfied that the action is brought in good faith
and that there is a reasonable possibility of success.322 This provision is an
attempt to prevent frivolous suits. Additionally, Part XXIII.1 avoids “strike
suits” by providing that the prevailing party is entitled to costs.323 Unlike
in the United States, where the PSLRA attempts to prevent frivolous suits
by raising the pleading standard required to state a claim at all,324 Part
XXIII.1 attempts to prevent frivolous suits by assessing the merits of the
claim at the earliest stage and by granting costs to the prevailing party.
From 2006 to 2011, thirty-four Part XXIII.1 actions were filed.325 By
December 2012, nine of those cases had settled and twenty-five were
pending.326 Every settled case settled for an amount exceeding C$1

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
Id. § 138.4.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 138.8.
Id.
Id. § 138.11.
See supra Part III.A.
Willis, supra note 308, at 4.
Id. at 28.

BARBER MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

394

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/26/2014 9:51 PM

[Vol 24:349

million: the total of all settlements against all defendants—not just
auditors—was C$68.35 million, and the average settlement was
approximately C$8.5 million.327 Then, in 2013, Ernst & Young settled the
Sino-Forest case for C$117 million.328
C. The Sino-Forest Fraud
Sino-Forest Corporation (Sino-Forest) was a Chinese forestry
company registered in Ontario and headquartered in Hong Kong.329 It went
public in Alberta through a reserve takeover in 1994, and in 1995 it listed
on the Toronto Stock Exchange.330 On June 2, 2011, its share price
plummeted when Carson Block of Muddy Waters, LLC, alleged that SinoForest had fraudulently inflated its assets and earnings.331 Muddy Waters,
like Citron Research, which exposed the Longtop fraud, is a short-selling
firm that researches public company financial disclosures, identifies
companies with questionable financial reporting, takes a short position in
them, and then discloses its research to the market.332 It specializes in
Chinese frauds.333
Muddy Waters reported that Sino-Forest was “the granddaddy of
China RTO [reverse takeover] frauds.”334 It “was engaged in aggressive
fraud from the time it went public.”335 It used undisclosed “authorized
intermediaries,” which were actually related entities, to fabricate sales and
to exaggerate assets.336 One of these intermediaries had as its registered
address an empty field in a fishing village.337 Most of Sino-Forest’s
revenues came from these intermediaries, allowing Sino-Forest to claim a

327. Id.
328. Peter Koven, Judge Approves Ernst & Young Settlement for Sino-Forest Shareholders, FIN.
POST (Toronto), Mar. 20, 2013, http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/20/judge-approves-ernstyoung-settlement-for-sino-forest-shareholders/.
329. Andy Hoffman & Mark Mackinnon, The Roots of the Sino-Forest Mystery, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Sept. 13, 2011, 5:45 PM, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/the-roots-of-thesino-forest-mystery/article594111/?page=all.
330. Id.
331. Statement of Allegations, ¶ 10, In re Ernst & Young LLP, Ontario Securities Commission
(Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Proceedings-SOA/soa_20121203_
ernst-young.pdf.
332. Hibah Yousuf, How Muddy Waters Spots Fraud in China, CNN MONEY (May 2, 2012, 9:39
AM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/02/markets/muddy-waters-carson-block/.
333. Id.
334. MUDDY WATERS, LLC, REPORT ON SINO-FOREST CORPORATION 1 (2011), available at http://
d.muddywatersresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MW_TRE_060211.pdf.
335. Id. at 4.
336. Id. at 1.
337. Id. at 1, 27.
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gross margin of fifty-five percent.338 Its financial claims, like those of
Longtop, were audacious in their obvious implausibility. For example, its
claimed Yunnan province sales would have exceeded harvesting quotas
sixfold and would have required over 50,000 log-transporting trucks.339
Sino-Forest used an opaque offshore structure—at least twenty entities
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands—to conceal its fraud.340 SinoForest was audited by Ernst & Young’s Canadian entity, Ernst & Young
LLP.341 Concerning the quality of Ernst & Young’s audits, Muddy Waters
Research said that Sino-Forest’s “board of directors appears to be the
retirement plan for former Ernst & Young partners.”342
Muddy Waters estimated that Sino-Forest’s shares were worth less
than $1 per share.343 On May 27, 2011, Sino-Forest’s shares closed at
$18.39 per share.344 The day after Muddy Waters Research released its
report, they closed at $5.23 per share.345 On August 26, 2011, the Ontario
Securities Commission suspended trading in Sino-Forest shares because the
company had engaged in fraud: its shares then became worthless.346 On
January 10, 2012, Sino-Forest announced that its financial statements and
audit reports should not be relied on.347 On March 30, 2012, Sino-Forest
filed for bankruptcy.348
On June 20, 2011—only eighteen days after Muddy Waters released
its report—a pension fund holding Sino-Forest shares filed suit against
Sino-Forest, Ernst & Young, and many other defendants.349 The fund
alleged, regarding Ernst & Young, negligent misrepresentation and
statutory claims under Part XXIII.1, among other things.350 On December

338. Id. at 1.
339. Id. at 2.
340. Id. at 33.
341. Id. at 2.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 3.
344. GOOGLE FINANCE, http://www.google.com/finance (get quotes search) (last visited Nov. 9,
2013).
345. Id.
346. Christopher Donville, Sino-Forest Trading Halted as OSC Rescinds Order That Executives
Resign, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 26, 2011, 4:52 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0826/sino-forest-executives-ordered-to-resign.html.
347. Statement of Allegations, supra note 331, ¶ 14.
348. Sino-Forest Files for Bankruptcy Protection, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2012, 17:58 ET), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17569840.
349. Notice of Action, Trs. of the Labourers’ Pension Fund of Cent. & E. Can. v. Sino-Forest
Corp., 2012 ONSC 2937 (Can. Ont.) (No. CV-11-429003-00CP).
350. Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, Trs. of the Labourers’ Pension Fund of Cent. and E.
Can., 2012 ONSC 2937 (No. CV-11-431153-00CP).

BARBER MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

396

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/26/2014 9:51 PM

[Vol 24:349

3, 2012, the Ontario Securities Commission filed charges against Ernst &
Young, alleging that its audits constituted a breach of section 78 of the
OSA.351 That same day, Ernst & Young settled the Part XXIII.1 suit for
C$117 million.352 The settlement was approved on March 20, 2013.353
The contrast with the Longtop litigation is shocking. In the United
States, a shareholder suit under Rule 10b-5 arising from an audacious
China-based securities fraud could not survive a motion to dismiss. The
investors received nothing, and the auditors paid nothing. In Canada, a
shareholder suit arising under Part XXIII.1 from an audacious China-based
securities fraud proceeded and, eighteen months later, settled for a recordbreaking amount. Three points of comparison are particularly notable:
1) Vicarious liability was not an issue in the Sino-Forest case because
the auditor was Ernst & Young’s Canadian affiliate.
2) The Ontario Securities Commission’s charges, filed against Ernst &
Young on December 3, 2012, probably influenced Ernst & Young’s
decision to offer a settlement that same day. On the same December 3,
2012, the SEC filed administrative proceedings against Deloitte for failing
to provide the SEC with audit working papers related to Chinese
companies—including Longtop, certainly—trading on U.S. markets. But
that had no impact on the Longtop litigation: the amended complaint was
dismissed on April 8, 2013. The court stood by its amazing conclusion that
Deloitte had “performed a diligent audit, only to be duped by Longtop’s
fraud.”354
3) The Canadian plaintiff in the Sino-Forest fraud did not need to
show scienter to state a claim—scienter, if shown, would have simply
removed the statutory limit on damages. To proceed, the plaintiff needed
only to persuade the court that the claim was meritorious. But the U.S.
plaintiffs in the Longtop fraud were required to allege scienter by pleading
with particularity facts giving rise to a “strong inference” of scienter.355 As
discussed in Part III.A, it is nearly impossible for a U.S. plaintiff alleging
China-based fraud to do this. Even the SEC could not obtain Deloitte’s
work papers from China until well after the dismissal of the Longtop
plaintiffs’ claims against Deloitte.

351. Statement of Allegations, supra note 331, ¶ 65.
352. Kevin LaCroix, E&Y Settles Ontario Sino-Forest Securities Suit for $117 Million, D&O
DIARY (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/12/articles/securities-litigation/ey-settlesontario-sino-forest-securities-suit-for-117-million/.
353. Gray, supra note 265.
354. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d. 561, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
355. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(4) (2012).

BARBER MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

6/26/2014 9:51 PM

BULL IN THE CHINA MARKET

397

VI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
U.S. and Canadian auditor liability regimes had certain similarities,
pre-Enron. Both had developed, by the late 1990s, to a point at which it
was virtually impossible to show auditor fraud. In the United States,
auditors received protections from liability to investors under the PSLRA.
In Canada, tort law developed in a way that limited investors to derivative
suits against corporate auditors—problematic when the corporation itself is
a fraud.
After Enron, however, U.S. and Canadian regulation took markedly
different approaches. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the United States focused on
increasing regulatory oversight of auditors. Ontario also increased
regulatory oversight of auditors but additionally created a statutory civil
liability regime. When confronted with China-based securities frauds, the
U.S. model has not protected investors well. It bears noting, again, that
Sino-Forest’s auditor was the Canadian affiliate of Ernst & Young, but
Longtop’s auditor was the Chinese affiliate of Deloitte. Nonetheless, it is
impossible to compare the results of litigation against Longtop and SinoForest and conclude that investors in U.S. capital markets are as well
protected from China-based frauds as are investors in Canadian markets.
An auditor providing an audit opinion for a Chinese company listed in
Toronto surely feels more performance pressure from potential legal
liabilities than an auditor providing an opinion for a Chinese company
listed in New York.
The U.S. experience with frauds by U.S.-listed Chinese firms, when
considered alone and when considered in comparison with recent Canadian
experience, suggests at least four possible reforms to better protect U.S.
investors. First, the PSLRA and Tellabs go too far in requiring scienter to
be effectively proven before discovery. Tellabs requires courts to dismiss
complaints against auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese firms unless the
allegations give rise to such a strong inference of scienter that no
reasonable person could imagine any compelling inference to the contrary.
But at that stage the auditor always can (and will) say, “It’s China—we
were duped too.” Under Tellabs, the court must decide whether this is a
compelling inference before discovery—i.e., before the auditor must
produce the work papers and other documents that establish whether the
auditor was in fact “duped.” It is difficult to see how, at the Rule 12(b)(6)
stage, courts can make informed decisions that the inference of auditor
scienter is more or less compelling than the inference that the issuer’s fraud
overcame the auditor’s diligence when the underlying events—the
transactions being audited and the audit itself—take place in China.
Courts need to screen claims for merit prior to commencement of
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expensive trials of those claims. This is recognized both in the heightened
pleading requirements of the PSLRA and in Part XXIII.1’s leave-of-thecourt requirement. The heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA,
however, are particularly difficult in cases alleging reckless audits in
China. The standard effectively forces courts to search for an apology for
the auditor. Cases alleging fraud on the other side of the world may present
the imagination with too much scope. A judge in Manhattan inferring what
happened in China from advocacy by New York lawyers is not anchored in
the contextual reality of the case in anything like the degree to which he or
she is when inferring what happens on Wall Street. In the context of
Chinese audits, the pleading standard amplifies the impact of skilled
advocacy and reduces the impact of the facts of the case.
For example, in the Longtop case, the Southern District of New York
concluded, “DTTC performed a diligent audit, only to be duped by
Longtop’s fraud.”356 This was supported, in significant part, by the finding
that Longtop’s arrangement with XLHRS “would not lead a reasonable
auditor to suspect wrongdoing, given that this sort of staffing arrangement
is common.”357 “Given that this sort of staffing arrangement is common” is
obviously a finding of fact on a material fact in dispute, despite the Rule
12(b)(6) posture of the case. And it is an erroneous finding of fact.358 But
how would the court know? The adversarial system assumes that the court
will be informed by counsel representing the litigants,359 but this is unlikely
to be effective before the litigation begins in earnest. The PSLRA pleading
standard invites factual findings without a record because courts must
gauge the plausibility of competing explanations for alleged facts to make a
determination as to whether those alleged facts give rise to a “strong
inference” of scienter before the parties may develop the factual record. In
effect, auditor due diligence becomes a pleadings issue: instead of being an
affirmative defense for which the auditor bears the burden of proof, as
under Ontario’s Part XXIII.1, it is a hypothetical excuse that an auditor
may proffer before anything is proven.
Courts screening complaints against auditors to decide which ones
should be litigated at least to the point of an answer need to be informed by
some background subject matter expertise. It therefore might be wise for
courts to use a special master possessing such expertise. Originally, special
356. In re Longtop Fin. Techs. Sec. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 2d. at 581.
357. Id. at 577.
358. See supra Part II.B.
359. E.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (“This [adversarial] system is premised on the
well tested principle that truth—as well as fairness—is ‘best discovered by powerful statements on both
sides of the question.’” (citation omitted)).
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masters appointed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure heard trial
testimony and reported recommended findings of fact “when the issues
[were] complicated.”360 Since 2003, special masters can be used under
Rule 53 to assist any pre-trial or post-trial role if the parties consent.361
Special masters have been used to hear Rule 12(b)(6) motions in federal
and state courts.362 Removing the necessity of the parties’ consent for the
use of a special master could allow a court to appoint a master to report
recommendations to the court concerning the “plausibility” of a complaint
alleging auditor negligence.
Second, making scienter an element of the substantive standard for
auditor liability imposes too high of a burden on plaintiffs. Clearly,
auditors must be protected from “liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”363 In the United States,
this has come to mean that liability can only be had against an auditor
under Rule 10b-5 if the auditor acted with scienter. Ontario’s Part XXIII.1
sensibly accomplishes this protection through its cap on damages absent
proof of scienter. The comparison of the Longtop scandal in the United
States with the Sino-Forest scandal in Canada suggests that the Canadian
policy better serves the public policy goal of protecting investors.
Even in U.S. securities laws, scienter is not always a requirement for
liability. For example, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933364 does not
require scienter and in some situations is an available action against
auditors involved in financial statement frauds.365 But Section 11 primarily
protects investors in the primary market by imposing liability for
misstatements in registration statements.366 Although it is available to
purchasers on secondary markets, 1) it requires purchasers to trace the
purchase back to the initial offering, 2) it requires purchasers to show
reliance on the registration statement where they bought securities more
than one year after the registration statement and the issuer had already
distributed financial statements, and 3) its statute of limitations requires
actions to be brought no later than three years after the security at issue was
360. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The
Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
347, 348 (2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b) (1938) (amended 2003)).
361. Id. at 352.
362. See, e.g., Askew v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-767V, 2012 WL 2061804 (Fed.
Cl. May 17, 2012); Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1983).
363. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
364. 15 U.S.C § 77k (2012).
365. DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 271 (3d ed. 2012).
366. Id. at 271–72.
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first offered to the public.367 Longtop held its IPO on October 24, 2007,
and a secondary offering on November 17, 2009.368 The fraud was exposed
on April 26, 2011.369 Thus, the statute of limitations had run with respect
to the 8.5 million shares issued through Longtop’s IPO but not the 4.25
million shares issued through the secondary offering. To have standing to
sue under Section 11, the Longtop plaintiffs would have had to trace their
shares to the secondary offering registration statement and to prove that
their purchase decisions had relied on that statement and not on Longtop’s
subsequent fraudulent financial statements.
Hence, the purchasers of Longtop securities, like any secondary
market purchaser duped by a financial statement fraud undetected for a few
years, needed to prove scienter to have recourse against the auditor on
whom they had relied for protection against financial statement frauds.
Instead, Deloitte’s repeated attestations to the veracity of Longtop’s
financials only served to prolong the fraud to the point that scienter had to
be proven. As noted above, when the audit takes place in China, it is
perhaps impossible even to plead scienter adequately. But pleading
standards aside, it is not clear what public interest is served by making
scienter a substantive requirement for auditor liability to secondary market
purchasers. Why should auditors receive greater protection from liability
regarding long-standing financial statement frauds over successive Form
10-Qs than from liability regarding similar but nascent frauds on a Form S1?
Third, a domestic accounting network affiliate should bear vicarious
liability for foreign affiliates’ audits of companies listed on domestic
exchanges. Investors look to U.S. audit firms for assurance regarding
financial statements for companies listed on U.S. exchanges. Auditors
should not be allowed to defeat this reasonable expectation through
organization as an international network of affiliates trading under the same
name as the U.S. firm. After all, “[t]he prospect of liability . . . constitutes
‘one of the major stimuli to objective and unbiased consideration of the
problems encountered in a particular [audit] engagement.”370 It would be
in the public interest if this prospect of liability were to prevent trusted
auditors from extending their brand into new markets in which they are

367. Id. at 272–73. 334–35.
368. Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, ¶¶ 39–40.
369. Id. ¶ 44.
370. Deborah A. DeMott, Further Perspectives on Corporate Wrongdoing, In Pari Delicto, and
Auditor Malpractice, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 350 n.52 (2012) (quoting Codification of Financial
Reporting Policies § 602.02.f.i, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,274 (2009)) (describing the SEC’s view
on auditor liability).
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more certain of their ability to collect audit fees than of their ability to
attest to financial statements. Perhaps the easiest way to accomplish this
would be to require the U.S. affiliate of a global audit firm to “sign” any
audit opinions or similar statements used in SEC filings, analogously to the
practice of using a locally-admitted lawyer to file briefs drafted by out-ofstate lawyers. After all, it does seem incongruous to rely on audit firms
beyond the reach of the SEC, such as DTTC, to ensure the accuracy of SEC
filings.
Fourth, the scope of auditor liability could be made inversely
contingent on the effectiveness of cross-border SEC regulation. The
current standoff between the SEC and Chinese regulators shows that crossborder regulation by the SEC is not always an available substitute for
auditor liability. In markets such as China, where local authorities resist
SEC supervision and investigation of auditors,371 U.S. investors are less
protected, and the public policy need to expose auditors to liability to
investors is correspondingly greater. Therefore, it may be beneficial to
increase the scope of auditor liability—ideally, the scope of liability for the
auditor’s U.S. affiliate—in those markets.
For example, in markets where the SEC cannot effectively investigate
auditors, scienter will be almost impossible to show. If the SEC cannot
obtain auditor work papers, or if the SEC can obtain those work papers
only after months or years of tense, high-level negotiations, then there is no
reason to suppose that a private litigant could timely obtain those work
papers. Exposing auditors to greater liability in the U.S. market for audits
occurring in markets beyond the SEC’s reach—for example, by removing
any statutory cap on liability, if one existed—would have several
potentially salutary effects. It would cause U.S. audit firms to supervise the
operations of affected local affiliates much more closely. It would also
give U.S. audit firms great hesitation in extending their brand to markets in
which they cannot provide assurance services meeting U.S. market
expectations. Finally, and most importantly, it would incentivize them to
pressure local authorities to come to an agreement with the SEC.
CONCLUSION
Auditors are private parties granted an exclusive right to perform a
public regulatory function. The Supreme Court held unanimously that “the
independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any
employment relationship with the client.”372 Auditors’ professional
371. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
372. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984).
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standards, however, do not protect the investing public’s reasonable
expectations with regard to Chinese entities listed on U.S. exchanges.
Those standards have developed from the self-interested responses of the
auditing profession to public criticisms of its failures to perform its public
function adequately. Nor does the law concerning auditor liability protect
the investing public’s reasonable expectations. Instead, it provides the
auditing profession near-immunity from investor complaints.373 Protecting
the public’s reasonable expectations requires exposing auditors to at least
the possibility of liability when their public audits fail to meet those
expectations. The value of “tinkering with liability standards” is not to
compensate investors for their losses—securities class action suits
generally fail to compensate investors—but to provide “a sober reminder
that financial frauds will be aggressively pursued by well-armed and
resourceful private attorney[s] general[].”374

373. See Alison Frankel, The Near-Impossible Standard for Showing Auditor Fraud REUTERS,
Apr. 9, 2013, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/04/09/the-near-impossiblestandard-for-showing-auditor-fraud/ (citing the Longtop decision as evidence of the near-impossibility
of an investor class successfully stating a fraud claim against an auditor).
374. JAMES D. COX, STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING
PROFESSION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 4 (2007).

